Tort Answers to the Problem of Corporate Criminal Mens Rea by Sheley, Erin L.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 97 | Number 4 Article 2
5-1-2019
Tort Answers to the Problem of Corporate
Criminal Mens Rea
Erin L. Sheley
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Erin L. Sheley, Tort Answers to the Problem of Corporate Criminal Mens Rea, 97 N.C. L. Rev. 773 (2018).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol97/iss4/2
97 N.C. L. REV. 773 (2019) 
TORT ANSWERS TO THE PROBLEM OF 
CORPORATE CRIMINAL MENS REA* 
ERIN L. SHELEY** 
The respondeat superior (vicarious liability) standard, by which 
courts hold corporations liable for the crimes of their employees, 
has been widely criticized as being overinclusive insofar as it 
punishes faultless entities. Less acknowledged is that, due to its 
requirement that the employee intended in part to benefit the 
corporation, the standard is also underinclusive in cases of sexual 
violence facilitated by a corporate entity. This Article argues that, 
to solve these corporate liability problems within criminal law, 
we should learn from the parallel development of corporate 
liability in the sphere of tort law, from which respondeat superior 
was derived in the first place. No comprehensive effort has yet 
been made to examine how courts have, in tort respondeat 
superior, addressed the problems of over- and 
underinclusiveness that emerge in that realm. In light of the 
lessons revealed in tort case law, I argue that criminal respondeat 
superior should apply where the government can show (1) a 
crime occurred, regardless of whether or not any individual 
employee had the intent to benefit the corporation; (2) an 
omission by the corporation to take reasonable steps to prevent 
the crime; and (3) the substantial risk of such a crime was 
objectively foreseeable to a reasonable person undertaking the 
corporation’s enterprise. 
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The concept of mens rea has had something of a political 
moment over the past few years. A rare bipartisan effort to reform 
the Federal Criminal Code, which would have, among other things, 
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relaxed mandatory minimums in sentencing,1 failed recently due to 
disagreement over its “mens rea reform” provision.2 The proposed 
bill would have amended the Federal Criminal Code to provide that, 
“the Government [must] prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant acted .	.	. willfully, with respect to any element for which 
the text of the covered offense does not specify a state of mind.”3 
Supporters of the provision note that the massive Federal Criminal 
Code4 and the broad discretion it already allows prosecutors5 has 
grown even more threatening to the morally innocent due to the low 
mens rea standards that distinguish federal criminal law from its state 
counterparts.6 They argue that, due to the size and complexity of the 
Federal Criminal Code, the absence of a mens rea requirement 
increases the likelihood that people will be convicted without having 
known or reasonably anticipated that they were violating criminal 
law.7 
Opponents of this provision, however, argue that requiring a 
mens rea element of willfulness would essentially render offenders 
immune from liability for reckless or grossly negligent conduct.8 The 
federal government currently prosecutes conduct such as fraud, 
environmental offenses, and other common white-collar crimes that 
 
 1. Justin George, Can Bipartisan Criminal-Justice Reform Survive in the Trump 
Era?, NEW YORKER (June 6, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/can-
bipartisan-criminal-justice-reform-survive-in-the-trump-era [https://perma.cc/WJ8D-LMFD]. 
 2. See Matt Apuzzo & Eric Lipton, Rare White House Accord with Koch Brothers on 
Sentencing Frays, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/us/
politics/rare-alliance-of-libertarians-and-white-house-on-sentencing-begins-to-fray.html 
[https://perma.cc/258B-GZYJ (dark archive)] (discussing disagreement over the bill). 
 3. Mens Rea Reform Act of 2015, S. 2298, 114th Cong. §	28(b) (2015). 
 4. While over 4000 criminal statutes exist, that number does not include the 
countless other federal “crimes” created by administrative agencies. See Julie Rose 
O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code”: Return of Overfederalization, 37 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 57, 57–58 (2014). 
 5. Michael L. Seigel & Christopher Slobogin, Prosecuting Martha: Federal 
Prosecutorial Power and the Need for a Law of Counts, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1107, 1119–
21; see also O’Sullivan, supra note 4, at 60, 62–63. 
 6. Mens Rea: The Need for a Meaningful Intent Requirement in Federal Criminal 
Law: Hearing Before the Over-Criminalization Task Force of 2013 of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 113th Cong. 14–15 (2013) (prepared statement of Dr. John S. Baker, Jr., Visiting 
Professor, Georgetown Law School); cf. O’Sullivan, supra note 4, at 62–63 (providing the 
example of honest services fraud). 
 7. See John G. Malcolm, The Pressing Need for Mens Rea Reform, HERITAGE 
FOUND. (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/report/the-pressing-
need-mens-rea-reform [https://perma.cc/VLK2-82GD] (stating that “innocent mistakes or 
accidents can become crimes” if there is a lack of adequate or any mens rea requirement). 
 8. See Zach Carter, House Bill Would Make It Harder to Prosecute White-Collar 
Crime, HUFFPOST (Nov. 16, 2015, 3:23 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/white-
collar-crime-prosecution_us_564a2336e4b06037734a2f84 [https://perma.cc/VK63-RYQL]. 
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already lack a specified mens rea requirement.9 Officials in the 
Department of Justice under the Obama administration contended 
that the legislation “would make it significantly harder to prosecute 
corporate polluters, producers of tainted food and other white-collar 
criminals.”10 
The fact that a dispute over mens rea for white-collar offenses 
derailed what would have been a historic bipartisan effort at criminal 
justice reform underscores the political fault lines around the question 
of how corporate crime fits into our traditional understandings of 
punishment. To oversimplify the situation into a crude dichotomy: the 
outcome of the reform effort suggests that liberals wish to maintain a 
broad swath of potential criminal liability for white-collar offenders, 
while conservatives wish to reduce the overall amount of criminal 
liability for regulatory offenses, including white-collar offenses. In 
other words, views on the current federal enforcement of white-collar 
crime seem to have eclipsed common ground on drug offenses and 
other areas more commonly affecting individual offenders. 
The sudden political stakes of white-collar mens rea urge that we 
revisit a narrower question that is well trodden but unresolved in the 
scholarly literature: When should a corporation be held liable as an 
entity for the crimes its employees committed? The current standard, 
announced by the Supreme Court in 1909 and unchanged since then, 
imports the concept of respondeat superior from tort law: employers 
are vicariously liable for all of the crimes of their employees 
committed within the scope of their employment, without any 
showing of corporate fault.11 Critics of this corporate liability standard 
make nearly identical arguments to those of the low mens rea 
standards in the Federal Criminal Code: it offends the notion that 
criminal culpability tracks with moral guilt,12 it overdeters commercial 
conduct through its vagueness and lack of predictability,13 and its 
 
 9. See Apuzzo & Lipton, supra note 2; Carter, supra note 8. 
 10. Apuzzo & Lipton, supra note 2. 
 11. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493–95 (1909). 
 12. See, e.g., John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of 
Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329, 1339 (2009); see also William S. 
Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647, 655 (1994); Gerhard 
O. W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation: A Study of the Model Penal Code Position 
on Corporate Criminal Liability, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 41–46 (1957). 
 13. See generally Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 319 (1996) (arguing that corporate criminal liability results in overdeterrence). 
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overbreadth allows prosecutors unfettered discretion to shape 
criminal justice through charging decisions.14 
In this Article, I take seriously the overbreadth critique of the 
respondeat superior standard for corporate criminal liability. In 
addition to the well-known issues of overbreadth, I identify a 
significant area in which criminal respondeat superior—at both state 
and federal levels—is underinclusive. Specifically, the current 
requirement that an employee must intend to benefit the corporation 
has the effect of shielding even reckless or knowing corporate 
employers from liability in the very worst criminal cases: those of 
physical and sexual violence by employees committed in connection 
with their employment. Ironically, while the overbreadth of corporate 
criminal liability offends the core aim of criminal punishment, so too 
does its underbreadth. Morally innocent corporations may be 
punished while prosecutors are unable to punish some of the most 
morally guilty. 
This Article argues that, to solve these problems within the 
criminal law, we should learn from their parallel development in the 
sphere of tort law. Respondeat superior was, after all, a tort doctrine 
in the first place. Yet no comprehensive comparative effort has been 
made to examine how courts have, in tort respondeat superior, 
addressed the problems of over- and underinclusiveness that are 
nearly as pervasive in that realm and apply those lessons to criminal 
law. Here, I apply the judicial and theoretical developments in tort 
respondeat superior to the purposes of corporate criminal law and 
offer a new standard for corporate criminal liability. 
This analysis starts with a comparison of the purposes and 
functions of tort and criminal law, which have similar competing 
goals. Just as criminal jurisprudence has been plagued by conflict 
between utilitarian and retributive theories of punishment,15 the 
traditional instrumentalist view of tort law as motivated by either 
deterrence or risk spreading has faced a significant challenge by the 
“rights-based” account, which turns on the duties of one person to 
another.16 Yet the particular tort goal of risk spreading—which courts 
 
 14. See, e.g., Miriam Hechler Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035, 1045–
48 (2008); Andrew Weissmann with David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate 
Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 414–15, 427 (2007). 
 15. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 307–08 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 16. See CHARLES O. GREGORY & HARRY KALVEN, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
TORTS 689 (1959) (claiming that “[t]he central policy issue in tort law is whether the 
principal criterion of liability is to be based on individual fault or on a wide distribution of 
risk and loss”); Kenneth S. Abraham, Strict Liability in Negligence, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 
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regularly cite as the justification for strict liability doctrines such as 
respondeat superior—applies far less clearly to criminal law, which 
generally prioritizes the redress of public harm over making a victim 
whole. This in and of itself argues against a system of pure vicarious 
criminal liability for faultless corporations. 
Tort case law suggests mechanisms for refining the concept of 
corporate criminal fault. In cases where respondeat superior might be 
potentially overinclusive—specifically, cases of unintentional torts by 
employees—the common law tempers its harshness. Unlike in 
criminal law, with its vast array of statutory strict liability offenses, 
tort law’s background principles of negligence make it nearly 
impossible for a faultless corporation to be on the hook for the 
actions of a faultless employee.17 In addition, we see foreseeability 
doctrines emerging in the case law, imposing liability only where 
harm is typical of a particular commercial enterprise.18 This strongly 
suggests that criminal respondeat superior can be profitably modified 
by some form of negligence requirement. 
On the flip side, courts have also dealt with the potential 
underinclusiveness of respondeat superior in the tort context in cases 
where plaintiffs sue employers for the sexual misconduct of their 
employees. Recovery in these cases was once greatly limited by 
courts’ refusal to hold entities liable for the intentional torts of their 
employees, on the theory that such torts could not have benefitted the 
corporation.19 Yet, over time, courts have increasingly replaced the 
intent-to-benefit requirement with a form of causation analysis, 
asking whether there was a nexus between the assailant’s employment 
and the harm to the victim.20 
In light of these lessons, I argue that criminal respondeat 
superior should apply where the government can show (1) a crime 
occurred, regardless of whether or not any individual employee had 
the intent to benefit the corporation; (2) an omission by the 
corporation to take reasonable steps to prevent the crime; and (3) the 
substantial risk of such a crime was objectively foreseeable to a 
reasonable person undertaking the corporation’s enterprise. Criminal 
negligence standards already exist throughout the law. Developing 
 
271, 273 (2012) (arguing that “tort law doctrines may need to satisfy both instrumental and 
rights-based concerns in order to be stable and persistent”). 
 17. See infra text accompanying notes 239–47. 
 18. See infra text accompanying notes 267–70. 
 19. See infra Section III.B.2. 
 20. See infra text accompanying notes 270–80. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 773 (2019) 
2019] TORT ANSWERS 779 
such a standard for corporate criminal mens rea makes sense given 
the tort foundations of respondeat superior. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I summarizes the state of 
criminal respondeat superior and its substantial critical literature, 
including the most significant alternative proposals. Part II argues 
that, in addition to creating the much-lamented overbreadth 
problems, the current law of criminal respondeat superior likewise 
underpunishes in cases of what I call “corporate violence.” Part III 
presents the lessons to be learned from the theory and common law 
of respondeat superior in tort law. Part IV incorporates these tort 
developments into a new, better-tailored standard for corporate 
criminal liability. 
I.  ENTITY LIABILITY AND ITS CRITICS 
As far back as the thirteenth century, Pope Innocent IV 
articulated what has come to be known as the “‘fiction’ theory” of the 
corporation when he described ecclesiastical bodies as both distinct 
entities as a matter of social fact and personae fictae—lacking a body 
or will and thus not susceptible to excommunication.21 Over the past 
200 years, legal theorists have clashed over two views of the 
fundamental nature of a corporation.22 Corporate realism holds that a 
corporation’s legal personality is actually a manifestation of its real 
personality in society.23 Corporate nominalism holds that a 
corporation is simply a contractual arrangement amongst individual 
shareholders.24 While corporate nominalism lost ground in the 1920s, 
it has been revived more recently with the contractual theory of the 
firm, a descendant of corporate nominalism, which defines 
corporations as “legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of 
contracting relationships among individuals.”25 The question of 
whether a corporation should be criminally liable separate from its 
employees turns to some extent on which of these views we take to be 
more accurate. Can a network of contracts legitimately be said to 
have independent moral agency such that it should receive the 
 
 21. See John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 
YALE L.J. 655, 665–66 (1926); Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The 
Corporate Personality Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 583, 584 (1999). 
 22. See Iwai, supra note 21, at 583–84. 
 23. See id. at 584. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976) 
(emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted); see also Iwai, supra note 21, at 584–85. 
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denunciative sanction of the criminal law? U.S. courts have answered 
this question in the affirmative.26 In so doing, however, they have 
created a loose and highly controversial doctrine of entity liability 
that has bedeviled scholars and practitioners alike for over a century. 
A. The Legal Standard for Corporate Criminal Liability 
In 1909, in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. United 
States,27 the Supreme Court expressly abandoned the rule that 
corporations could not be held criminally liable.28 At issue in that case 
was whether it was constitutional for Congress to hold entities liable 
for violating the Elkins Act, which amended the Interstate Commerce 
Act to criminalize both parties to an arrangement where shippers 
demanded and received rebates from railroad companies in restraint 
of trade.29 The Court concluded that the law “cannot shut its eyes to 
the fact that the great majority of business transactions in modern 
times are conducted through these bodies, and particularly that 
interstate commerce is almost entirely in their hands.”30 The Court 
found that allowing corporations continued immunity from 
prosecution “would virtually take away the only means of effectually 
controlling the subject-matter and correcting the abuses aimed at.”31 
Even the Court’s recognition of corporate criminal liability, 
which it declared was “in the interest of public policy,”32 has been 
described as a burst of “judicial activism.”33 The means the Court 
chose to accomplish this, however, have been even more 
controversial. It merely imported the tort doctrine of respondeat 
superior into the criminal law, holding that both the actus reus and 
mens rea of any individual employee acting within the scope of his or 
her authority could be attributed to the corporation, even when acting 
“against [the corporation’s] express orders.”34 Courts subsequently 
elaborated on this standard in two significant ways. First, the 
employee must act, at least partially, for the purposes of benefitting 
 
 26. See infra Section I.A. 
 27. 212 U.S. 481 (1909). 
 28. Id. at 492–96. 
 29. Id. at 491–92 (citing Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (1903), repealed by Hepburn 
Act, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (1906)). 
 30. Id. at 495. 
 31. Id. at 495–96. 
 32. Id. at 494. 
 33. Philip A. Lacovara & David P. Nicoli, Vicarious Criminal Liability of 
Organizations: RICO as an Example of a Flawed Principle in Practice, 64 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 725, 733 (1990). 
 34. N.Y. Cent., 212 U.S. at 493–96. 
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the corporation (a requirement that is not ironclad in respondeat 
superior doctrine under tort law).35 Second, an employee need only 
have apparent authority to act on behalf of the corporation, which is 
met where a third party reasonably believes the agent has the 
authority to perform the act in question.36 
Respondeat superior was not the inevitable standard for 
corporate criminal liability. Six years after the Court decided New 
York Central, the House of Lords addressed a similar issue in a 1915 
case called Lennard’s Carrying Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co.37 but did 
not apply the doctrine of respondeat superior. While this was a civil 
case, the court created a standard for entity liability that became the 
touchstone for criminal cases in the United Kingdom, and it remains 
so, with a few exceptions, to this day.38 In Lennard’s Carrying, 
Viscount Haldane announced the so-called directing mind test, also 
known as the identification test, for entity liability: 
A corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind of its own any 
more than it has a body of its own. Its active and directing will 
must consequently be sought in the person of somebody who 
for some purposes may be called the agent, but is really the 
directing mind and will of the corporation, the alter ego and 
centre of the personality of the corporation. That person may 
be under the direction of the shareholders in general meeting. 
That person may be the board of directors itself, or it may be, 
and in some companies it is so, that that person has an authority 
co-ordinate with that of the board of directors, given to him 
under the articles of association, and, being appointed by the 
general meeting of the company, he can only be removed by the 
general meeting of the company.39 
 
 35. See Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719, 722 (5th Cir. 1963); 
infra Section II.A. 
 36. See United States v. Great Am. Ins. of N.Y., 738 F.3d 1320, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2013); 
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972) (“[L]iability may 
attach without proof that the conduct was within the agent’s actual authority .	.	.	.”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §	2.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“Apparent authority 
is the power held by an agent or other actor to affect a principal’s legal relations with third 
parties when a third party reasonably believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of 
the principal and that belief is traceable to the principal’s manifestations.”). 
 37. [1915] KB 1281 (Eng.). 
 38. See Neil Cavanagh, Corporate Criminal Liability: An Assessment of the Models of 
Fault, 75 J. CRIM. L. 414, 416 (2011) (“Under the common law, the identification doctrine 
has been the primary method employed to attribute criminal liability to a corporation. The 
identification doctrine originates from the civil law case of Lennard’s Carrying Co. Ltd[.] 
v[.] Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd.”). 
 39. Lennard’s Carrying, [1915] KB at 1284. 
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In other words, unlike simple respondeat superior, the directing mind 
test requires that the prosecution identify a particular employee 
whose stature in the corporation is significant enough that he or she 
can be said to represent the “ego” of the organization. It is that 
person’s mens rea that can be imputed to the corporation for the 
purposes of establishing corporate criminal intent. Canadian courts 
adopted this standard in criminal cases, until a Parliamentary 
intervention in this century,40 with the additional feature that there 
could be more than one directing mind within a corporation.41 
Despite the novelty and fairly dramatic new world order 
announced in New York Central, the Supreme Court has not since 
weighed in substantively on the essence of corporate criminal liability. 
This has left lower courts with the unenviable task of figuring out how 
to apply the respondeat superior standard to the vast range of 
potential criminal offenses and across the spectrum of fault 
requirements. For criminal offenses with a scienter element—a 
showing of subjective fault by the offender—a straightforward 
application of respondeat superior would leave a corporation liable if 
any individual employee possessed the requisite degree of fault. 
However, because this seems inconsistent with the presumption of 
fault as a precondition to criminal liability, some federal courts have 
declined to impute an employee’s subjective fault to the corporate 
employer without evidence that management in some way knew 
about or acquiesced to the misconduct.42 
In contrast, another doctrinal puzzle arises when no single 
employee possesses the requisite mens rea necessary for the offense 
but a number of employees have, together, committed the unlawful 
act. In these cases, a minority of courts have applied the so-called 
collective knowledge doctrine, in which they aggregate the knowledge 
of all of the employees to create the necessary scienter.43 The leading 
case on collective knowledge is United States v. Bank of New England, 
N.A.,44 in which a bank was charged with violating the Currency 
 
 40. See Peter MacKay, Corporate Liability in Canada, GLOBAL COMPLIANCE NEWS, 
https://globalcompliancenews.com/white-collar-crime/corporate-liability-canada/ [https://perma.cc/
3TWA-6Z8Y]. 
 41. See, e.g., Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662, 693 
(Can.). 
 42. See J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME §	2.07[A] (4th 
ed. 2017). 
 43. 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §	8.21, at 
531–32 (3d ed. 2010); see also United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738 
(W.D. Va. 1974). 
 44. 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987). 
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Transaction Reporting Act (“CTRA”) by failing to report cash 
transfers greater than $10,000.45 To be liable under the CTRA, a 
defendant must “willful[ly]” commit the violation, a mens rea element 
that other courts have held requires “proof of the defendant’s 
knowledge of the reporting requirement and his specific intent to 
commit the crime.”46 The court noted that “[w]illfulness can rarely be 
proven by direct evidence, since it is a state of mind,” but “is usually 
established by drawing reasonable inferences from the available 
facts.”47 On thirty-one separate occasions, Bank of New England 
tellers cashed checks to the same customer that added up to a sum 
greater than $10,000.48 While each individual check valued less than 
$10,000, on each of the thirty-one occasions the individual checks 
were presented simultaneously to a single bank teller and valued 
more than $10,000 in aggregate.49 Dismissing the bank’s argument 
that the compartmentalized nature of knowledge within the 
corporation shielded it from liability, the court upheld the 
corporation’s conviction based on the collective knowledge of its 
disparate employees.50 
The collective knowledge approach has been criticized by courts 
and commentators alike for essentially imposing the unrealistic 
requirement that senior management keep track of the knowledge of 
all of its employees.51 As the Fifth Circuit observed when declining to 
consider the collective knowledge of all corporate officers in 
determining scienter under the Securities and Exchange Act, 
where, as in fraud, an essentially subjective state of mind is an 
element of a cause of action also involving some sort of 
conduct, such as a misrepresentation, the required state of mind 
 
 45. Id. at 846–47. 
 46. United States v. Hernando Ospina, 798 F.2d 1570, 1580 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting 
United States v. Eisenstein, 731 F.2d 1540, 1543 (11th Cir. 1984)). 
 47. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d at 854 (citing United States v. Wells, 766 F.2d 12, 
20 (1st Cir. 1985)). 
 48. Id. at 847–48. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 856. 
 51. See, e.g., United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1275 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010), vacating in part, 653 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D.D.C. 2009); Thomas A. Hagemann & 
Joseph Grinstein, The Mythology of Aggregate Corporate Knowledge: A Deconstruction, 
65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 210, 238–39 (1997); cf. In re Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 870 F. 
Supp. 1293, 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (dismissing “the imputation of every bit of knowledge 
known to each individual employee” and instead requiring both that the employee have 
learned the information in the course of an employment-related activity and that the 
employee be of a “sufficient level of corporate responsibility to justify charging the 
corporation with that knowledge” (emphasis added)), aff’d, 995 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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must actually exist in the individual making .	.	. the 
misrepresentation, and may not simply be imputed to that 
individual on general principles of agency.52 
With even the courts at odds as to how exactly to apply criminal 
respondeat superior, it is unsurprising that the doctrine has attracted 
extensive criticism. 
B. Criticisms of Respondeat Superior 
Before addressing the particular criticisms of the respondeat 
superior standard itself, there is a preliminary question of whether it 
is appropriate for corporate criminal liability to exist in the first place. 
Detractors argue that criminally punishing an entity violates all three 
of the general purposes of criminal punishment: retribution, 
deterrence, and rehabilitation. For example, John Hasnas 
characterizes vicarious liability as, inherently, the punishment of 
innocents—in this case shareholders, stakeholders, and other 
employees—which he argues is incompatible with the retributive 
principle of punishing no more and no less than what is deserved.53 
Some empirical literature also suggests that corporate criminal 
liability—which obviously cannot result in imprisonment but only 
fines—may inefficiently overdeter misconduct relative to existing 
administrative and civil sanctions.54 In light of these problems, Miriam 
Baer has proposed an insurance system to replace criminal liability, in 
which insurance carriers would review a company’s compliance 
programs, use a number of factors to estimate the likelihood that its 
employees would commit crimes, and then charge the company for 
insurance on that basis.55 
Supporters of corporate criminal liability point to the sheer 
amount of harm corporations can cause,56 as well as the expressive 
value, from the moral perspective of the general public, of punishing 
 
 52. Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols. Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 53. See Hasnas, supra note 12, at 1339; see also Laufer, supra note 12, at 655; Mueller, 
supra note 12, at 41–46. Hasnas also argues that, whatever the benefits of corporate 
criminal liability in terms of deterrence or rehabilitation, they can only be justified by 
punishing guilty parties, not innocents. Hasnas, supra note 12, at 1339–40. 
 54. See generally Fischel & Sykes, supra note 13 (arguing against corporate criminal 
liability and in favor of appropriate civil remedies); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal 
Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996) (arguing that civil 
liability avoids the undesirable consequences of corporate criminal liability). 
 55. Baer, supra note 14, at 1035, 1079–81. 
 56. Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Criminal Liability: When Does It Make Sense?, 46 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1437, 1437 (2009). 
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corporations in addition to their constituents.57 Others draw upon the 
recent scholarship on the “utility of desert” to suggest that if social 
norms support criminal liability for corporations, we risk 
delegitimizing the criminal law by failing to impose it.58 Elsewhere I 
have defended the existence of corporate criminal liability under 
certain circumstances on the grounds that when a corporation 
commits a crime it imposes a unique set of harms on its victims that 
flow from the nature of the corporate structure itself.59 I contend that 
it is appropriate, retributively, for criminal law to redress the 
increased psychological and cultural harms related to a corporation’s 
enduring nature and institutional connections with state power.60 
Redressing this harm is an important function of criminal punishment 
that cannot be attained by civil penalties alone. We may also reap 
additional expressive benefits from redressing such harm, though I 
argue that expressive benefits alone cannot justify punishment in the 
absence of actual harm.61 
A new deep dive on this question is, however, beyond the scope 
of this Article. It is also not terribly pressing given that, whatever its 
theoretical challenges, some form of corporate criminal liability is 
likely here to stay.62 The bases for critics’ objections to its mere 
existence remain relevant to the second question: Is respondeat 
superior the appropriate standard for determining when corporations 
should be liable for the crimes of their agents? 
1.  The Case that Respondeat Superior Punishes Too Much 
The most common argument against respondeat superior is that 
it exacerbates the problems of justice already inherent in vicarious 
criminal liability by overly broadening the range of employee conduct 
that can be attributed to the entity.63 Under a theory of respondeat 
 
 57. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 609, 618–22 (1998). 
 58. See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. 
L.J. 473, 521 (2006). 
 59. Erin Sheley, Perceptual Harm and the Corporate Criminal, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 225, 
259–63 (2012). 
 60. See id. 
 61. Id. at 238. 
 62. See Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 612 (2012) 
(“[C]orporate punishment is not likely to yield to corporate regulation any time soon. The 
public has increasingly registered greater moral outrage in response to corporate 
governance scandals. Moral outrage, in turn, fuels retributive motivations and therefore 
supports those institutions best poised to take advantage of such motivations.”). 
 63. See Deborah A. DeMott, Organizational Incentives to Care About the Law, LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer & Autumn 1997, at 45 (“[I]n the absence of complicity at 
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superior, one rogue, low-level employee acting against company 
policy—and even against specific instruction—can bring criminal 
liability down upon the entire operation, even for criminal offenses 
that require the defendant to act knowingly or willfully.64 If the notion 
of corporate “intent” makes sense at all, it seems illogical to infer it 
from the individual intent of one rogue employee. 
These theoretical problems of overbreadth have become 
exacerbated in practice. Prosecutors have a significant amount of 
leverage in the criminal justice system generally, usually due to an 
asymmetry of resources vis-à-vis individual defendants. But in the 
case of corporations, prosecutorial leverage is due in large part to the 
devastating market consequences of an indictment.65 This leverage, 
combined with such a broad liability standard as respondeat superior, 
which precludes as it does any hope of arguing lack of corporate mens 
rea, leaves corporations with so little chance of success at trial that 
they have little incentive to test the government’s case. 
This state of affairs gave rise to the popularity of the deferred 
prosecution agreement (“DPA”) as a means of resolving federal 
corporate criminal investigations.66 In a deferred prosecution 
agreement—which, unlike a plea bargain, is not subject to judicial 
implementation—the government agrees not to prosecute the 
corporation in exchange for various financial penalties and 
investigative cooperation, a practice which has been widely described 
as requiring the corporation to be “agents of the state.”67 There is at 
 
high levels, vicarious liability often taxes the corporation and its shareholders with the 
consequences of conduct that the corporation itself has prohibited.”); Laufer, supra note 
12, at 655–56; Andrew Weissmann, A New Approach to Corporate Criminal Liability, 44 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1319, 1319–20 (2007). 
 64. See United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983) (“[A] 
corporation may be held criminally responsible for antitrust violations committed by its 
employees .	.	. even if, as in Hilton Hotels and American Radiator, such acts were against 
corporate policy or express instructions.”); see also United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 
467 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary 
Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 204 (3d Cir. 1970). 
 65. See Barry A. Bohrer & Barbara L. Trencher, Prosecution Deferred: Exploring the 
Unintended Consequences and Future of Corporate Cooperation, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1481, 1483 (2007); Weissmann, supra note 63, at 1321. It is worth noting that the degree of 
the adverse market reaction to an indictment appears to vary depending on the crime 
alleged: among fraud offenses, for example, financial reporting offenses see the largest 
stock drops, fraud offenses against the government second, fraud offenses against 
stakeholders third, and fraud offenses involving regulatory violations showing little effect. 
See Michael K. Block, Optimal Penalties, Criminal Law and the Control of Corporate 
Behavior, 71 B.U. L. REV. 395, 412 (1991). 
 66. See Bohrer & Trencher, supra note 65, at 1481–84. 
 67. Id. at 1481. 
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least some evidence that federal prosecutors have started to abuse 
this power. Recently, a series of corporate defendants in Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) cases made the unusual decision to 
take their cases to trial rather than cooperate.68 These trials revealed 
instances of the DOJ and FBI resorting to improper tactics to make 
their cases in the absence of the cooperation attained through a 
DPA.69 
2.  The Case that Respondeat Superior Punishes Too Little 
While the lion’s share of criticisms of respondeat superior relate 
to the excessive amount of criminal exposure it leaves corporations, 
there are circumstances under which it can also be underinclusive. 
Given the size and complexity of the modern corporation, it is often 
difficult to keep track of what employee is making what decision at 
 
 68. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 831 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2011) 
(explaining that the present case was “the first Foreign Corrupt Practices Act criminal 
prosecution against a corporation to proceed to jury trial”); Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. 
Lawyers, FCPA Case: U.S. v. Goncalves (Gun Sting Case), CRIM. DEF. ISSUES, 
https://www.nacdl.org/criminaldefense.aspx?id=23896 [https://perma.cc/6PVF-QQWM]. 
 69. The conviction of Lindsey Manufacturing Company, the first corporation to stand 
trial under the FCPA, was subsequently overturned by a federal judge who noted that 
the Government team allowed a key FBI agent to testify untruthfully before the 
grand jury, inserted material falsehoods into affidavits submitted to magistrate 
judges in support of applications for search warrants and seizure warrants, 
improperly reviewed e-mail communications between one Defendant and her 
lawyer, recklessly failed to comply with its discovery obligations, posed questions 
to certain witnesses in violation of the Court’s rulings, engaged in questionable 
behavior during closing argument and even made misrepresentations to the Court. 
Aguilar, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 1182. In the case of the so-called Africa Sting operation, the 
government drafted notorious con man Richard Bistrong to make cases against twenty-
two executives and employees in the military and law enforcement products industry for 
engaging in a scheme to pay bribes to the defense minister of an African country. See 
Richard L. Cassin, Where is Richard Bistrong Today?, FCPA BLOG (Oct. 31, 2012, 5:28 AM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/10/31/where-is-richard-bistrong-today.html [https://perma.cc/
FS58-YY54]. While dismissing the charges against the defendants, the judge, who had 
earlier expressed concerns about how the case was being prosecuted, said, “This appears 
to be the end of a long chapter in the annals of white collar criminal enforcement.” Africa 
Sting—in the Words of Judge Leon, FCPA PROFESSOR (Feb. 23, 2012), 
http://fcpaprofessor.com/africa-sting-in-the-words-of-judge-leon/ [https://perma.cc/CWR5-
JZZP]; see also Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, supra note 68. Two weeks into the 
trial of Joseph Sigelman, a former co-CEO of PetroTiger who had been accused of 
conspiring to pay bribes to a former worker at Colombia’s state-owned Ecopetrol SA in 
exchange for a contract, a chief witness against him recanted. Ex-PetroTiger Co-CEO 
Avoids Prison in Bribery Case, REUTERS (June 16, 2015, 3:31 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/petrotiger-sigelman/ex-petrotiger-co-ceo-avoids-prison-in-bribery-case-idUSL1N0Z21U
U20150616 [https://perma.cc/U644-DCFB]. Sigelman took a plea and did not receive any jail 
time. Id. 
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any given time.70 Because respondeat superior requires that some 
employee have the requisite mens rea while committing the requisite 
actus reus, it may be impossible to find such a person—either as an 
evidentiary matter or because, particularly for crimes that require 
some heightened mental element of intent or knowledge, such a 
person literally does not exist despite the fact that a crime has actually 
occurred.71 Particularly in cases involving specific-intent offenses 
where multiple employees appear guilty, each of whose potential guilt 
casts doubt on the guilt of the others, a corporate defendant may be 
able to obtain a so-called patchwork verdict where jurors agree that 
the accused has done something illegal but do not agree upon which 
of several distinct acts have occurred.72 
As mentioned above, some courts developed the doctrine of 
collective knowledge to adapt respondeat superior to deal with such 
situations, but the majority have rejected it.73 And, in any case, the 
doctrine fails to account for how to assign liability in cases requiring 
specific intent above and beyond knowledge—what can be done 
where multiple employees responsible for partial portions of the actus 
reus have conflicting intents?74 
C. Alternative Theories 
In the face of this morass, commentators have developed a range 
of alternative mens rea standards for corporate criminal liability, 
intended to impart coherence to the field. Many of them would 
improve the status quo, but most suffer from at least one or another 
practical or theoretical flaw. This section briefly describes the most 
significant proposed alternatives. 
Identification Theory. The oldest and most historically 
established alternative to respondeat superior, identification theory, 
 
 70. Cf. Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazábal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter, 
2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 81, 107 (discussing the difficulty of “locat[ing] the single guilty 
agent or the constellation of guilt in the corporation”). 
 71. See id. 
 72. See Stacey Neumann Vu, Note, Corporate Criminal Liability: Patchwork Verdicts 
and the Problem of Locating a Guilty Agent, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 460 (2004). For an 
example of a patchwork verdict, see United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 455–56 (5th 
Cir. 1977) (reversing the trial court’s instruction to a jury that concurrence on facts was 
unnecessary so long as each juror found that the defendant had committed either one or 
the other of two charged acts constituting “selling or receiving” a stolen vehicle). 
 73. See text accompanying notes 43–52; see also Hagemann & Grinstein, supra note 
51, at 227 (noting that “only a few courts addressing criminal or civil issues have alluded to 
the collective knowledge rule” (footnotes omitted)). 
 74. Mihailis E. Diamantis, Corporate Criminal Minds, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2049, 
2071 (2016). 
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remains the law of the land in the United Kingdom for most cases of 
corporate crime that do not involve death.75 The American Law 
Institute has also endorsed it in the Model Penal Code, under which a 
corporation may be held criminally liable if “the commission of the 
offense was authorized .	.	. by the board of directors or by a high 
managerial agent.”76 The problem with identification theory is that it 
does not capture the internal reality of the large, modern corporation 
and makes it too difficult to punish corporations where pervasive 
wrongdoing cannot be traced to the specific knowledge of one high-
ranking official. 
In Canada, the gross negligence of Curragh Resources Inc., the 
private company that managed the Westray coal mine, and its 
political supporters resulted in the deaths of twenty-six Nova Scotia 
miners in 1992.77 After the Crown’s failure to obtain any criminal 
convictions, widespread public outcry resulted in Parliament 
supplanting common law identification theory with a statutory 
provision intended to make it easier to convict corporations.78 During 
the parliamentary debates over what was then called Bill C-45, critics 
of identification theory pointed out that “[r]arely do high-level 
corporate officials personally engage in the specific conduct or make 
the specific decisions that result in [workplace disasters].”79 Instead, 
through policy decisions or cultural habit, they maintain a corporate 
environment where subordinates feel encouraged or expected to cut 
corners on compliance, in spite of the existence of compliance 
policies.80 It is also easy to see how, if identification theory were the 
law of the land, corporations could avoid liability for any subjective-
fault crime simply by shielding their top brass from actual knowledge 
of the relevant goings-on, like organized criminal syndicates. 
Genuine Corporate Fault. A number of proposed models of 
corporate liability attempt to replace vicarious liability with efforts to 
define fault through features of the corporate form.81 One variant, 
 
 75. See Cavanagh, supra note 38, at 416–17, 421. 
 76. MODEL PENAL CODE §	2.07(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
 77. Westray Remembered: Explosion Killed 26 N.S. Coal Miners in 1992, CBC (May 8, 
2012, 3:18 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/westray-remembered-explosion-
killed-26-n-s-coal-miners-in-1992-1.1240122 [https://perma.cc/B9DB-T32N]. 
 78. See id. 
 79. DAVID GOETZ, PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH BRANCH, LS-457E, BILL C-45: AN 
ACT TO AMEND THE CRIMINAL CODE (CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF ORGANIZATIONS) 2 
(2003), http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2016/bdp-lop/ls/YM32-3-372-C45-eng.
pdf [https://perma.cc/XT6E-HFYA]. 
 80. Id. 
 81. William S. Laufer & Alan Strudler, Corporate Intentionality, Desert, and Variants 
of Vicarious Liability, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1285, 1307 (2000). 
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proactive corporate fault, “attributes liability where a corporation’s 
practices and procedures are inadequate to prevent the commission of 
a crime.”82 Another, reactive corporate fault, focuses on the failure of 
the corporation to respond adequately to a criminal offense after it 
has been discovered.83 Both of these models violate the basic concept 
of mens rea. While they focus on actual “corporate” conduct rather 
than the acts of an employee, they measure fault with respect to acts 
other than the actual actus reus of the offense (namely, ex ante 
creation of policies or ex post investigation and remedies). 
Another variant of the genuine corporate fault school is Peter 
French’s theory of the Corporate Internal Decision Structure (“CID 
Structure”).84 French has identified the CID Structure—the 
combination of an organizational structure and formal corporate 
policies—as the appropriate proxy for actual corporate 
intentionality.85 According to French, “Corporate agency resides in 
the possibility of CID Structure licensed redescription of events as 
corporate intentional.”86 In other words, actions that appear 
authorized by the CID Structure can truly be said to be willed by the 
corporation as a whole. While French’s CID Structure theory works 
well to justify the possibility of corporate intentionality against its 
various critics (i.e., it does describe a mechanism by which corporate 
intentionality, above and beyond the disparate intents of individual 
employees, can be identified), it is a bit thin as an actual liability 
standard. If we limit corporate criminal liability only to those offenses 
where some intention can be identified through formal corporate 
structure and policy, we are narrowing the scope of corporate 
criminal law to the point of ineffectiveness. Crimes uncontemplated 
by formal policy happen all the time. CID Structure as a liability 
standard also suffers from some of the same problems as 
identification theory in the sense that those responsible for crafting 
formal policies may nonetheless be willfully ignorant of, or even 
encouraging of, deviations from them. 
Compliance Program / Safe Harbor. One of the easier-to-
administer alternatives to pure respondeat superior would be 
retaining the current vicarious liability standard but allowing some 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. at 1308. 
 84. See Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207, 
211–15 (1979). 
 85. Id. at 212. 
 86. Id. at 215. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 773 (2019) 
2019] TORT ANSWERS 791 
sort of affirmative defense based on the corporation’s good faith.87 
For example, Ellen Podgor has proposed that corporations should be 
able to use evidence of a compliance program as part of a good faith 
defense.88 She notes that this would avoid punishing innocent 
shareholders when the corporation itself could be shown to have had 
compliance programs in place to avoid the misconduct (presumably 
also creating incentives for corporations to continue to implement 
these programs).89 Another variant of this idea would require the 
government to prove the lack of bona fide compliance program as 
part of its affirmative case.90 For example, Andrew Weissman and 
David Newman have proposed a form of negligence standard that 
requires proof of a “fail[ure] to have reasonably effective policies and 
procedures to prevent the conduct.”91 This proposal would create a 
beneficial limitation on prosecutorial discretion but has been 
criticized for creating a vague standard of liability that would 
generate confusion and overdeterrence.92 Another downside to all of 
these theories is that allowing a safe harbor for liability could 
incentivize corporations to create “paper” compliance programs 
behind which misconduct occurs under the table. It would be, 
essentially, a dodge for evaluating actual mens rea. 
Corporate Ethos. Like the safe harbor model, a corporate ethos 
theory of corporate criminal liability also considers the existence of a 
compliance program, but as part of a broader inquiry into corporate 
culture generally. Australia, for example, allows proof of corporate 
intent or recklessness through evidence that “a corporate culture 
existed within the body corporate that directed, encouraged, tolerated 
or led to non-compliance with the relevant provision.”93 The leading 
 
 87. See Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 
78 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 462–64 (1993); see also H. Lowell Brown, Vicarious Criminal 
Liability of Corporations for the Acts of Their Employees and Agents, 41 LOY. L. REV. 
279, 309–12 (1995). 
 88. See generally Ellen S. Podgor, A New Corporate World Mandates a “Good Faith” 
Affirmative Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1537, 1538 (2007) (“[A]n affirmative defense 
should be offered to those who present ‘good faith’ efforts to achieve compliance with the 
law as demonstrated in their corporate compliance program.”). 
 89. See id. at 1543. 
 90. See Weissmann, supra note 63, at 1322; Weissmann with Newman, supra note 14, 
at 440 (dismissing concerns about “paper” compliance programs as unrealistic because, 
“[f]or a company to succeed at such a ruse, it would need to implement an inadequate 
program, pass it off as sufficient, not otherwise be subject to criminal liability because of 
the pervasiveness of the criminal conduct at issue which would undermine establishing the 
adequacy of any program, and fool prosecutors, the court, and jurors”). 
 91. Weismann with Newman, supra note 14, at 414. 
 92. Baer, supra note 14, at 1074. 
 93. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 3 ch 2 div 12.3(2)(c) (Austl.). 
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American proponent of corporate ethos theory, Pamela Bucy, urges a 
similar rule: conviction should result only where the government 
“proves that the corporate ethos encouraged agents of the 
corporation to commit the criminal act.”94 Aspects of ethos that Bucy 
considers include hierarchical structure, corporate goals, post-offense 
behavior, and the existence of a compliance program.95 The most 
immediately apparent problem with corporate ethos theory is that 
showing causation would seem to present evidentiary issues. Even 
with Bucy’s specific criteria, it is hard to pinpoint a direct causal link 
between something as diffuse as “culture” and a specific instance of 
wrongdoing. Mihailis Diamantis has pointed out that if only evidence 
of culture as a generalized contributing cause were sufficient, then the 
case would run afoul of the evidentiary prohibition against character 
evidence used to show a propensity to commit a crime.96 
Constructive Corporate Fault. William Laufer has proposed 
perhaps the most nuanced mechanism for assigning criminal liability 
to corporations, which he describes as constructive corporate fault.97 
This standard requires proof of two things: “(1) an illegal corporate 
act; and (2) a concurrent corporate criminal state of mind.”98 To 
determine whether the act is attributable to the corporate entity, 
“[a]n objective test determines whether given the size, complexity, 
formality, functionality, decision making process, and structure of the 
corporate organization, the agents’ acts are fairly said to be the 
actions of the corporation.”99 Once it is determined that the acts may 
be attributed to the entity, the next question is what particular state of 
mind such a corporation would have.100 To determine whether a 
corporation possessed the appropriate level of mens rea to meet that 
element of the particular offense, we would ask “whether the average 
corporation of like size, complexity, functionality, and structure, given 
the circumstances presented, would have the required state of 
mind.”101 As Diamantis points out, however, this test nonetheless 
 
 94. Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1099 (1991). 
 95. See id. at 1101, 1138. 
 96. Diamantis, supra note 74, at 2072–73. But see Robert E. Wagner, Criminal 
Corporate Character, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1293, 1294 (2013) (arguing that evidence concerning 
the character of a corporation should be admissible in criminal settings to prove that the 
corporation acted in conformity with its alleged character). 
 97. See generally Laufer, supra note 12 (proposing a new standard for corporate 
culpability). 
 98. Laufer & Strudler, supra note 81, at 1308. 
 99. Id. at 1309. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1310. 
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presupposes some prior understanding of what mental state an 
“average corporation” would have in a particular set of 
circumstances, thereby immediately reconstituting the problem of 
determining what constitutes corporate mens rea.102 
Fact-Finder Inferences. Diamantis proposes that, in lieu of 
seeking theories of corporate mens rea, we allow fact finders to apply 
the same inferential processes for determining intent that they would 
use for natural persons.103 He notes that juries already discern 
individual human intent by drawing inferences from actions and 
circumstances in the absence of a clear view into the defendant’s 
brain.104 Pointing to cognitive science literature that shows humans 
assign blame to groups in the same way that they assign blame to 
individuals,105 he suggests that juries be allowed to “determine which 
narrative [of corporate intent] they find most plausible.”106 
This idea, while appealingly simple to implement, runs afoul of 
the rule of law. While jurors infer individual intent from actions, they 
necessarily do so by comparing the case to what they already know 
about how individual intent works, based upon being individuals with 
the capacity to form intent. Juries are frequently told, for example, to 
rely on their “common sense” and “intuition” to evaluate the 
credibility of witnesses.107 The law’s reliance on this particular 
function of juries has already been heavily criticized. Specifically, 
research suggests that jurors assimilate the evidence they hear along 
with their own past experiences into a coherent narrative, which acts 
as a sort of cognitive filter and affects their evaluation of individual 
pieces of evidence.108 Thus, we already have reason to believe that, as 
Diamantis says, jurors certainly can and do use narrative to assign 
blame to individuals. But we also know that, due to the potentially 
 
 102. Diamantis, supra note 74, at 2074. 
 103. Id. at 2053, 2076–77. 
 104. Id. at 2076–77. 
 105. Id. at 2077–80. 
 106. Id. at 2082. 
 107. See, e.g., Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 845–46 (1973) (explaining that the 
jury could use its common sense and experience to find that the defendant knew he had 
possession of stolen property). 
 108. See REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE 
JURY 22–23 (1983); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision 
Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JURY DECISION MAKING 192, 192–
203 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993); Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive 
Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 560–61 (2004). It is this 
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race affects trial outcomes due to jurors’ sympathy for victims of the same race. See Nancy 
J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror Race 
on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 78 (1993). 
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subjective quality of these narratives, this may not always result in 
like cases being treated alike, which is an important feature of the 
rule of law.109 Even assuming this effect is unavoidable in a world of 
human fact finders—and even assuming, as has been argued, that 
scholars overstate the extent to which this phenomenon results in 
irrational jury decisions110—it seems unwise to actively rely on it and 
even amplify it. At least when jurors incorporate their own subjective 
narratives into their inferences about intent, they are comparing the 
facts of the case to something about which they have actual 
experience: what it means, as an individual, to intend something. If we 
ask them to perform the blaming function without any instruction 
about what the essence of corporate intent is, we are throwing the 
entire process of corporate criminal adjudication into an open-ended 
fog of subjectivity. There is no avoiding the need for a workable 
theory of entity liability. 
D. The Interaction of Respondeat Superior and the Federal Criminal 
Code 
The problem raised by critics, that respondeat superior results in 
excessive corporate criminal liability for blameless entities for the acts 
of rogue employees, is amplified in the federal context. To 
understand this problem, take as an example a pair of hypothetical 
prosecutions under §	331 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 
Section 331 prohibits, among other things, “causing” the 
“adulteration or misbranding of any .	.	. drug .	.	. in interstate 
commerce” or “causing” the “introduction or delivery for 
introduction into interstate commerce of any .	.	. drug .	.	. that is 
adulterated or misbranded.”111 Any person who takes or causes any of 
the actions proscribed in § 331 is guilty of a misdemeanor;112 if he or 
she had “the intent to defraud or mislead,” or was previously 
convicted under §	331, then he or she is guilty of a felony.113 
In the first example, we have Happy Drugs, a chain of 
compounding pharmacies that does business across most of the 
 
 109. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE §	38, at 237 (1971). 
 110. See David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN. 
L. REV. 407, 409 (2013) (criticizing the “myth” that juries ignore evidentiary instructions 
and arguing that “evidentiary instructions probably do work, but imperfectly, and better 
under some conditions than others”). 
 111. 21 U.S.C. §	331(a)–(b) (2012). 
 112. See id. §	333(a)(1); see also Yi-Chen Su, The Extent of Harm to the Victim as an 
Alternative Aggravating Factor for the Conviction of Felony Fraud in the Context of Food-
Safety Violations, 71 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 658, 659 (2016). 
 113. See 21 U.S.C. §	333(a)(2) (2012); see also Su, supra note 112, at 659. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 773 (2019) 
2019] TORT ANSWERS 795 
American East Coast and Midwest. The company has a strict training 
program for its employees, including education about the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act, and the many other complex FDA rules governing 
its business. Every three months, each facility is subject to regular 
inspections, as well as periodic random inspections. The company also 
conducts a yearly audit. John Doe, the manager of the Madison, 
Wisconsin, facility has fallen on hard times due to his daughter’s 
unexpected health issues and decides to make a little side cash by 
selling the active ingredient of one of Happy’s opioid painkillers on 
the street. Happy Drugs detects the problem in about a month upon 
random testing of a sample of product as part of their regular 
inspection. Doe is apprehended and charged with a variety of 
trafficking offenses. But, due to the fact that his theft of the 
ingredient caused underdosed medication to be sold on the street, 
Happy Drugs is also successfully prosecuted for a felony. Doe 
intentionally introduced adulterated medication into interstate 
commerce and, because the sales of the watered-down drug 
benefitted the corporation, his crime can be imputed to the wholly 
nonnegligent corporation. 
In the second example, we have the same basic players, with the 
exception that John Doe is distracted by his daughter’s health 
problems and does not notice when one of his employees made a 
mathematical error on the compounding specs for a new drug, which 
results in half doses of opioid being bottled and consequently 
mislabeled as full doses, which Happy Drugs immediately detects. In 
that case, due to the lack of mens rea element for a misdemeanor 
conviction under §	331, John Doe is arrested and criminally convicted, 
without the opportunity to make a defense of nonnegligence. 
Furthermore, Happy Drugs can be criminally convicted as well, 
despite being nonnegligent vis-à-vis their employee’s unintentional 
conduct. 
The first example showed the potential harshness of holding 
generally well-behaved, faultless corporations responsible for the 
criminal acts of individual employees. The second showed that the 
relationship between true fault and criminal liability is even more 
attenuated when courts impute even inadvertent employee actions to 
nonnegligent corporate employers for the purposes of imposing 
criminal liability. 
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II.  THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE VIOLENCE 
The critique of criminal respondeat superior summarized thus far 
focuses primarily on the extent to which it is overly punitive.114 The 
exception is the concern raised by critics who fear that evidentiary 
barriers and the complexities of corporate operations may sometimes 
result in corporate crimes going unpunished entirely where a criminal 
employee cannot be identified.115 Part II identifies another way in 
which respondeat superior systematically undercriminalizes corporate 
employers, precisely when the worst sorts of crimes have occurred. 
A. The Requirement that the Crime Benefit the Employer 
One of the few limiting principles of respondeat superior is that a 
corporation may only be bound by the acts of its employees when the 
employee has acted, at least in part, to benefit the corporation.116 This 
is a separate question from the related requirement that the employee 
have acted within the scope of his or her employment.117 As 
mentioned earlier, under traditional principles of agency in tort law, 
the question of whether an employee acted within the scope of his 
employment for the purposes of holding his employer liable for civil 
fraud is informed by the intent to benefit the employer.118 Under 
criminal law, however, they remain distinct elements.  
 
 114. See supra Section I.B.1. 
 115. See supra Section I.B.2. 
 116. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §	70, 
at 502 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that the rule applies when a “servant’s conduct .	.	. is 
actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master”); see, e.g., United States v. 
Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 25 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating that a corporate employer can be held liable 
for an employee’s actions if “the agent is ‘performing acts of the kind which he is 
authorized to perform,’ and those acts are ‘motivated—at least in part—by an intent to 
benefit the corporation’” (quoting United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241–42 (1st Cir. 
1982))); United States v. Jorgensen, 144 F.3d 550, 560 (8th Cir. 1998) (“A corporation is 
criminally responsible for the ‘acts of its officers, agents, and employees committed within 
the scope of their employment and for the benefit of the corporation.’” (quoting United 
States v. Richmond, 700 F.2d 1183, 1195 n.7 (8th Cir. 1983))). 
 117. See, e.g., United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 126–27 (1958) 
(holding that a partnership can be liable for acts committed knowingly by employees in 
the scope of their employment). 
 118. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §	2.04 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006) 
(“When [a transactional activity] is misused, for example to perpetrate a fraud for the 
employee’s sole benefit, the employer’s responsibility is often determined by whether the 
party injured reasonably believed the employee’s activity to be authorized.”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §	235 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (“An act of a servant 
is not within the scope of employment if it is done with no intention to perform it as a part 
of or incident to a service on account of which he is employed.”). 
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Indeed, in New York Central the Supreme Court highlighted the 
relevance of benefit to the employer as a particular justification for 
importing respondeat superior from tort law into criminal law in the 
first place. Discussing the findings of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, which formed the basis for the Elkins Act, the Court 
stated: 
It is a part of the public history of the times that statutes against 
rebates could not be effectually enforced so long as individuals 
only were subject to punishment for violation of the law, when 
the giving of rebates or concessions enured to the benefit of the 
corporations of which the individuals were but the 
instruments.119 
The Court’s interest here, as elsewhere in the opinion, is pragmatic: 
the regulation of interstate commerce would be impossible without 
the power to reach the benefitted corporations through the conduct 
of their employees.120 Employees are “instruments” when they act to 
the advantage of their employers. To be held criminally liable under 
respondeat superior, it is not necessary that the corporation received 
a benefit in fact from its employee’s actions so long as the employee 
intended to bestow it.121 On the flip side, as an evidentiary matter, 
courts allow the inference that an employee intended to benefit the 
corporation wherever his misconduct did indeed have that effect.122 
That said, when an employee commits a crime that is contrary to 
the interests of the corporation and from which the corporation 
derives no benefit, the corporation is not subject to criminal 
 
 119. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909). 
 120. See supra text accompanying note 119. 
 121. See United States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(“[W]hether the agent’s actions ultimately redounded to the benefit of the corporation is 
less significant than whether the agent acted with the intent to benefit the corporation.”); 
United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 242 (1st Cir. 1982) (“[A] corporation may not be 
held strictly accountable for acts that could not benefit the stockholders, such as acts of 
corporate officers that are performed in exchange for bribes paid to the officers 
personally.”); Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128–29 (5th Cir. 
1962) (“[An employee’s] act is no less the principal’s if from such intended conduct either 
no benefit accrues, a benefit is undiscernible, or, for that matter, the result turns out to be 
adverse.”). 
 122. See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 970 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (holding that an employee’s actual defrauding of his corporation nonetheless met 
the element of benefitting the corporation because his actions “promised some benefit” to 
the corporation); Automated Med. Labs., 770 F.2d at 407 (finding the element satisfied 
because the employee’s efforts at personal advancement also “depended on [the 
corporation’s] well-being”); Michael Nagelberg et al., Corporate Criminal Liability, 54 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1073, 1080 (2017). 
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liability.123 In Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. United States,124 the Fifth 
Circuit overturned the convictions of the defendant oil corporations 
whose employees engaged in a scheme involving the moving and 
reassigning of oil to other wells in violation of the Connally Hot Oil 
Act.125 The court found that the government had not proven intent to 
benefit the corporation, observing that while “[w]ithout Pasotex and 
its pipeline transportation, and without Standard’s purchase of such 
‘hot’ or non-existent oil, Thompson could not succeed,” nonetheless 
the employees “were doing their usual tasks in handling run tickets 
not to advance or further the interest of Pasotex” but “to further the 
criminal enterprise of which they were an indispensable part.”126 
In United States v. Ridglea State Bank,127 two banks had been 
charged with violating the False Claims Amendments Act after the 
federal government reimbursed the banks for losses on loans a single 
employee had fraudulently approved.128 In holding the banks not 
liable because the employee did not intend to benefit them, the court 
stated that the employee “must have known that the loans he 
approved would be defaulted, so that the banks would not make any 
money on interest on the loans.”129 Indeed, the employee’s “approval 
of fraudulent applications for FHA-insured loans endangered the 
bank’s ability to continue to handle FHA business and jeopardized 
the reputation of the banks and their financial integrity.”130 The 
employee’s actual purpose “was to line his own pockets .	.	. and to get 
money to make payments on loans previously approved by him on the 
basis of fraudulent applications, so that these earlier wrongdoings 
would remain concealed.”131 
Significantly, the Fifth Circuit rejected the government’s reliance 
on civil case law establishing that an employer is generally “held 
liable for the fraudulent misrepresentations of his agent, even though 
the agent acted without any intent to benefit his employer, so long as 
the third person reasonably believed that the agent was acting within 
the scope of his employment.”132 The court distinguished traditional 
 
 123. Nagelberg et al., supra note 122, at 1080–81. 
 124. 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962). 
 125. Id. at 122–24, 131. 
 126. Id. at 129. 
 127. 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1966), superseded by statute, False Claims Amendments Act 
of 1986, Pub. L. 99-562, §	2(b), 100 Stat. 3153. 
 128. See id. at 496–97. 
 129. Id. at 498. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 499. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 773 (2019) 
2019] TORT ANSWERS 799 
compensatory civil actions from the False Claims Amendments Act 
context, with its potential for forfeitures and double damages in 
excess of actual loss rendering it punitive in purpose.133 In so doing, 
the court reaffirmed the fact that, in a criminal case, the scope-of-
employment requirement and benefit to employer requirement are 
distinct.134 
The requirement that agents intend to provide a benefit to the 
corporation is meant to “insulate the corporation from criminal 
liability for actions of its agents which be inimical to the interests of 
the corporation or which may have been undertaken solely to 
advance the interests of that agent or of a party other than the 
corporation.”135 Standard Oil remains the rule by which courts decline 
to hold corporations criminally liable where the employee acted 
entirely in his or her own interest.136 Furthermore, while “a 
corporation may be liable for acts of its employees done contrary to 
express instructions and policies, .	.	. the existence of such instructions 
and policies may be considered in determining whether the employee 
in fact acted to benefit the corporation.”137 
Recently, however, the Fifth Circuit—again leading the way in 
developing this doctrine—added a new wrinkle. In United States ex 
rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.,138 a qui tam suit initiated by 
private parties under the Anti-Kickback Act, the government alleged 
the defendant defense contractor was vicariously liable for its 
employees’ acceptance of kickbacks in exchange for favorable 
 
 133. See id. at 499–500. 
 134. See id. at 498–99. 
 135. United States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(first citing Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962); and 
then citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW §	33 (1972)). 
 136. See Michael E. Tigar, It Does the Crime but Not the Time: Corporate Criminal 
Liability in Federal Law, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 211, 228 (1990) (describing Standard Oil as 
the “leading case” for the defense of no intent to benefit the corporation); see also United 
States v. Demauro, 581 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1978) (“However, since the Chemical 
employees involved here had been bribed to wash the currency without reporting the 
transactions as required by the Bank Secrecy Act, the bank could well have argued that it 
was not liable for their violations of the Act since the employees had acted in their own 
and not the bank’s interests.” (first citing United States v. Ridglea, 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 
1966); and then citing Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 
1962))); First Fed. Sav. Bank of Hegewisch v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 774, 792 (2002) 
(citing Standard Oil and later cases to hold that a corporation could not be held liable 
when an employee admitted to “embezzlement, misappropriat[ing] funds through 
unauthorized loans, and extortion,” because these crimes did not “benefit[] [the 
corporation] in any way”). 
 137. United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 138. 727 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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treatment on subcontracts.139 Relying on Ridglea and the fact that the 
Anti-Kickback Act (like the False Claims Amendments Act) allowed 
recovery in excess of loss and was thus quasi-criminal, the district 
court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that 
the government had “not sufficiently alleged that [Kellogg Brown & 
Root] employees were acting for the corporation’s benefit.”140 The 
Fifth Circuit reversed, finding no evidence of congressional intent to 
vary from the civil law standard and that actual compensation to the 
government for kickback-related losses might require penalties in 
excess of the value of the kickback itself.141 
Because Kellogg Brown did not, technically, involve criminal 
liability, it did nothing to change the rule that an employee’s crime be 
intended to benefit his employer in order for the employer to be held 
criminally liable. In demonstrating the blurry conceptual line between 
the scope-of-employment requirement and the intent-to-benefit 
requirement, however, it does underscore how precarious the 
doctrine is. Complex federal statutory regimes create what amounts 
to quasi-punitive liability, and courts now appear to treat some, but 
not all of them, like civil actions for the purposes of excusing the 
government from proving the intent to benefit. Given that fact, and 
given how few cases seem to turn on the intent-to-benefit 
requirement in the first place, it may seem that this doctrine excludes 
very few corporations from potential prosecution. That, however, is 
far from true. 
It is now a basic feature of our criminal justice system that the 
majority of prosecutions are resolved by plea bargain rather than 
trial.142 Thus, the outcome of any given case turns heavily on the 
prosecutor’s initial charging decision. These decisions turn at least in 
part on whether the government could win a case if it were to go to 
trial. While states have different rules governing a prosecutor’s use of 
discretion, they are all bound by the requirement that charging 
 
 139. Id. at 344–45. 
 140. Id. at 350–52. 
 141. See id. at 344, 352. 
 142. See Dylan Walsh, Why U.S. Criminal Courts Are So Dependent on Plea 
Bargaining, ATLANTIC (May 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/
05/plea-bargaining-courts-prosecutors/524112/ [https://perma.cc/BT5T-MAWU] (stating 
that approximately ninety-seven percent of federal cases are settled by plea bargaining); 
Benjamin Weiser, Trial by Jury, a Hallowed American Right, Is Vanishing, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/nyregion/jury-trials-vanish-and-justice-
is-served-behind-closed-doors.html [https://perma.cc/6T69-CKGF (dark archive)]. 
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decisions be limited by probable cause.143 Indeed, some states 
evaluate charging decisions based on objective, rather than subjective, 
standards, asking not whether a particular prosecutor believed she 
had probable cause to bring charges but whether a reasonable 
prosecutor would have so believed.144 Thus, a prosecutor should not—
and generally will not—bring charges if a particular element of an 
offense cannot be met. 
Federal prosecutors have specific guidance about how and when 
to charge corporations with misconduct, using the elements of 
criminal respondeat superior as a starting point. The Justice Manual 
states that “[a]gents may act for mixed reasons—both for self-
aggrandizement (direct and indirect) and for the benefit of the 
corporation, and a corporation may be held liable as long as one 
motivation of its agent is to benefit the corporation.”145 This suggests 
that federal prosecutors should not pursue corporate liability in cases 
where the agent’s sole motivation was self-aggrandizement. Against 
this backdrop, the requirement of intent to benefit the corporation 
necessarily screens out many claims against organizations where such 
intent to benefit cannot be shown. While state prosecutors generally 
lack such formalized guidance about corporate crime in their policy 
documents, they are, of course, subject to the same substantive law on 
the question of respondeat superior. 
This part reviews certain scenarios where, likely as a result of the 
intent-to-benefit requirement, prosecutors cannot and do not address 
corporate complicity in the very worst sorts of offenses, which I will 
call acts of “corporate violence.” I have argued elsewhere that when a 
corporation commits a crime, it imposes additional harms on its 
victims distinct from that which can be attributed to the individual 
employees who were its agents.146 These harms boil down to the oft-
documented sense of helplessness a victim feels when faced with a 
perpetrator that is temporally enduring, powerful, and 
 
 143. See NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS §	4-
2.4 (3d ed. 2009) (listing the probability of conviction as one of the factors appropriate for 
prosecutors to consider in making their charging decisions and noting that “commencing a 
prosecution is permitted by most ethical standards upon a determination that probable 
cause exists” but that “the charging standard should be the prosecutor’s reasonable belief 
that the charges can be substantiated by admissible evidence at trial”). 
 144. See Daniel S. Medwed, Emotionally Charged: The Prosecutorial Charging 
Decision and the Innocence Revolution, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2187, 2199 (2010). These 
states include California, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, and New York. Id. 
 145. Justice Manual §	9-28.210(B), DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-
principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations#9-28.210 [https://perma.cc/MCR9-
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 146. See Sheley, supra note 59, at 259–63. 
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organizationally complex.147 The shattering of a victim’s “belief in a 
just world”—a core psychological heuristic, central to wellbeing—that 
occurs when a corporate offender goes unpunished becomes a unique 
sort of harm flowing from the corporate structure itself.148 My original 
argument was directed toward conduct that easily meets the current 
standard for criminal respondeat superior—the long-term 
psychological harms suffered by the victims of corporate 
environmental offenses, for example.149 That argument was 
speculative in some respects because of the need for more 
psychological research on the victims of corporate crime. But there 
are a wealth of recent examples of how this harm arises most 
dramatically and most discernably in cases of corporate violence, 
where prosecution is not generally an option due to the intent-to-
benefit requirement. 
B. Corporate Sex Crimes 
In 1996, Dr. Larry Nassar was named national medical 
coordinator for the USA gymnastics team (“USA Gymnastics”).150 
The next year he also became team physician for the Michigan State 
University (“MSU”) gymnastics team and assistant professor at the 
university.151 Throughout the 90’s and early aughts, multiple parents 
and athletes reported to USA Gymnastics coaches, MSU coaches, 
MSU athletic staff, and, on one occasion, the Meridian Township 
Police Department, that Nassar performed irregular “treatments” 
that they perceived as sexual molestation.152 For almost twenty years, 
both MSU and USA Gymnastics failed to investigate the complaints, 
accepted Nassar’s assertions that his conduct constituted valid 
medical treatment, and continued to refer their athletes to him.153 In 
2014, MSU graduate Amanda Thomashow reported to a doctor at the 
MSU Sports Medicine Clinic that she had been sexually assaulted 
during an examination.154 At this time, University President Lou 
Anna K. Simon learned that a police report had been filed, but 
Nassar was allowed to continue seeing patients during the sixteen 
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 148. See id. 
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months of the police investigation.155 In August 2016, the Indianapolis 
Star published an investigation of sexual abuse of the USA 
Gymnastics team, featuring the account of Rachael Denhollander, 
Nassar’s first victim to go public with her story.156 In the end, Nassar 
pled guilty to seven counts of first-degree criminal sexual misconduct 
in Ingham County Circuit Court, three counts of first-degree criminal 
sexual conduct in Eaton County Circuit Court, and federal child 
pornography charges.157 
At Nassar’s state sentencing hearing, nearly 160 of the athletes 
he had abused delivered victim-impact statements.158 As I have 
argued elsewhere, close attention to the accounts of harm expressed 
in victim-impact statements is important not only for victim 
vindication and expression but also as a measure of the nature of the 
public harm created by the crime.159 Because victims’ narratives 
circulate through society outside the courtroom as well, the public 
experiences that harm through the lens of the victim’s subjective 
account.160 A survey of the Nassar victim-impact statements 
demonstrates how clearly the harm suffered by Nassar’s victims was 
magnified by the institutional roles of USA Gymnastics and MSU. 
The most famous victim, Aly Raisman, was team captain of both the 
2012 and 2016 gold-medal-winning USA Gymnastics teams and an 
individual silver medalist in the all-around and floor competitions at 
the 2016 games.161 Due to her high profile and eloquence, Raisman’s 
victim-impact statement became one of the most widely reproduced. 
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Notably, her indictment of Nassar emphasized the particular 
position of power he had been given by USA Gymnastics: “You were 
the USA Gymnastics national team doctor, the Michigan State’s 
Olympic team doctor. You were trusted by so many and took 
advantage of countless athletes and their families.”162 Her 
description of his abuse reveals how helpless she felt in a situation 
that had been created and imposed by USA Gymnastics as a 
condition of maintaining her career: “I don’t want you to be there, 
but I don’t have a choice. Treatments with you were 
mandatory.”163 And she notes how the organizations to which she 
was beholden as an athlete elevated him to positions of 
institutional importance: “You were decorated by USA 
Gymnastics and the United States Olympic Committee, both of 
which put you on advisory boards and committees to come up with 
policies that would protect athletes from this kind of abuse.”164 
Most significantly, Raisman criticized USA Gymnastics’ 
failure to do anything when they had notice of a problem: “False 
assurances from organizations are dangerous, especially when 
people want so badly to believe them. They make it easier to 
move away from the problem and enable bad things to continue to 
happen.”165 In pointing out the timespan of the ongoing denials, 
she suggested the enduring nature of USA Gymnastics as an 
organization, one of the precise features of a corporate criminal I 
have identified in my earlier work as contributing to a victim’s 
sense of helplessness in the face of a power asymmetry.166 She also 
points out the facilitating role played by USA Gymnastics in 
maintaining Nassar’s sexual power. 
Rachael Denhollander echoed Raisman’s theme, describing how 
organizational complicity by MSU and USA Gymnastics exacerbated 
and extended her sexual violation. Referring to her first experience of 
abuse, she said: 
[T]hree things I was very sure of. First, it was clear to me this 
was something Larry did regularly. Second, because this was 
something Larry did regularly, it was impossible that at least 
some women and girls had not described what was going on to 
 
 162. Mahita Gajanan, ‘It’s Your Turn to Listen to Me.’ Read Aly Raisman’s Testimony 
at Larry Nassar’s Sentencing, TIME (Jan. 19, 2018, 4:52 PM), http://time.com/5110455/aly-
raisman-larry-nassar-testimony-trial/ [http://perma.cc/9PR8-3LWW].  
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Sheley, supra note 59, at 258–59. 
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officials at MSU and [USA Gymnastics]. I was confident of this. 
And third, I was confident that because people at MSU and 
[USA Gymnastics] had to be aware of what Larry was doing 
and had not stopped him, there could surely be no question 
about the legitimacy of his treatment. This must be medical 
treatment. The problem must be me.167 
And, like Raisman, she conveyed how nonfeasance by the 
organizations that employed Nassar constituted additional acts of 
violence to the victims: “MSU, you need to realize that you are 
greatly compounding the damage done to these abuse victims by the 
way you are responding.”168 
Similarly, victim Amanda Thomashow stated that MSU 
exacerbated her sexual violation by normalizing it in the language of 
medicine, to which she, presumably, had no claims of knowledge: 
“Michigan State University, the school I loved and trusted, had the 
audacity to tell me that I did not understand the difference between 
sexual assault and a medical procedure.”169 In this account, Nassar 
and MSU formed a kind of interconnected block of authority; as 
Nassar wielded sexual control over her body, MSU claimed authority 
over her mind by denying her even interpretive agency. 
What these accounts all emphasize is the extent to which 
Nassar’s victims experienced organizational complicity by USA 
Gymnastics and MSU—through both their empowering Nassar and 
rejecting his victims’ stories—as additional acts of bodily violence. 
While these impact statements were intended to be directed to Nassar 
himself, the victims appeared to find it almost impossible to navigate 
their shared trauma from the sexual assault without addressing his 
organizational employers directly. Nassar had power not due to any 
intrinsic property but due to his identity as an agent of USA 
Gymnastics and MSU—the organizations upon which these girls and 
women perceived their athletic futures to rest. 
Given the deep involvement of USA Gymnastics and MSU from 
the perspective of the victims—so deep that these organizations 
became the focus of victim-impact statements directed at Nassar—the 
question arises as to whether the organizations themselves should be 
 
 167. Read Rachael Denhollander’s Full Victim Impact Statement About Larry Nassar, 
CNN (Jan. 30, 2018, 7:34 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/24/us/rachael-denhollander-
full-statement/index.html [https://perma.cc/SD2G-KLUB]. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Sonia Moghe & Lauren del Valle, Larry Nassar’s Victims, in Their Own Words, 
CNN (Jan. 17, 2018, 5:03 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/16/us/nassar-victim-impact-
statements/index.html [http://perma.cc/RB78-N3A5]. 
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criminally accountable. Surely the harm perpetrated under their 
auspices and with their authority for over two decades is worse than 
many of the federal regulatory offenses for which prosecutors 
routinely charge corporations. Unfortunately, however, even setting 
aside the unique sovereign immunity issues presented by MSU, a 
state organization, the respondeat superior standard most likely 
precludes criminal action based on Nassar’s agency.170 
Despite the seeming breadth of criminal respondeat superior, 
courts have routinely held that corporations cannot be liable for 
rape.171 Yet, as V.S. Khanna notes, the argument that corporations 
cannot commit these acts is weak because “[o]nce society is willing to 
accept vicarious liability and to impute agents’ acts to the corporation, 
the corporation should in theory be capable of ‘committing’ rape or 
murder.”172 Khanna suggests that the more powerful conceptual 
roadblock to corporate liability under these circumstances is the fact 
that most crimes of violence and sexual violence do not fall within the 
scope of the perpetrator’s employment.173 If anything, traumatizing 
their athletes is inimical to the goals of the organizations. 
It would seem prosecutors could try to reach beyond Nassar 
himself to prosecute individual officers and employees of USA 
Gymnastics and MSU for negligent oversight of their physician, 
particularly in light of the complaints they received.174 After Penn 
State Assistant Football Coach Jerry Sandusky was convicted for 
numerous counts of child sexual abuse in connection with the 
nonprofit organization for youth he ran under university auspices, 
several Penn State administrators were convicted of child 
endangerment.175 The various officials who ignored the reports on 
 
 170. As a private 501(c)(3) entity, USA Gymnastics poses no such sovereign immunity 
concerns. See About USA Gymnastics, USA GYMNASTICS, https://usagym.org/pages/
aboutus/pages/about_usag.html [https://perma.cc/HYD4-FUWW]; see also Jack’s Canoes 
& Kayaks, LLC v. Nat’l Park Serv., 937 F. Supp. 2d 18, 40 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding that “a 
501(c)(3) non-governmental organization [was] not entitled to sovereign immunity”). 
 171. See RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIME AND SENTENCING §	3.2.3(d), at 
177–78 (1994). 
 172. Khanna, supra note 54, at 1484 n.37; see also GRUNER, supra note 171, §	3.2.3(b), 
at 175–76. 
 173. Khanna, supra note 54, at 1484 n.37. 
 174. See Michael McCann, Four Key Sports Law Implications of the Larry Nassar 
Scandal, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.si.com/olympics/2018/01/
19/larry-nassar-scandal-sports-law-implications [https://perma.cc/3ADE-DSV7]. 
 175. Camila Domonoske, 3 Ex-Penn State Officials Get Jail Time for Failure to Report 
Sandusky Abuse, NPR (June 2, 2017, 2:56 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/
2017/06/02/531243225/3-penn-state-officials-sentenced-to-jail-time-for-failure-to-report-sandusky 
[https://perma.cc/GJX4-G29Y]. 
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Nassar are potentially similarly guilty; language of the Michigan child 
abuse laws, however, seems to preclude this.  
The Michigan child abuse statute includes in its definition of 
applicable parties “any .	.	. person who cares for, has custody of, or 
has authority over a child regardless of the length of time that a child 
is cared for, in the custody of, or subject to the authority of that 
person,” which would seem broad enough to include USA 
Gymnastics staff.176 Yet the requisite mens rea stipulated is either 
knowing or intentional harm to the child,177 something that could be 
very hard to prove on the facts. Those accused could also be liable for 
an omission that results in harm to a child, but the statute defines 
“omission” somewhat narrowly as “a willful failure to provide food, 
clothing, or shelter necessary for a child’s welfare or willful 
abandonment of a child.”178 Thus, the specific omissions of USA 
Gymnastics and MSU employees do not seem to fall into this 
prohibition. In short, while cases like Sandusky’s demonstrate how 
prosecutors of sexual assault in the course of employment might be 
able to address institutional misconduct by targeting employees 
beyond the assailant himself, not all state criminal codes make that 
possible. Even where prosecutors are able to make charges stick to 
other employees (which they should do in these cases where possible, 
and may yet find a way to do in the case of USA Gymnastics/MSU),179 
failure to impose criminal liability on the organizations themselves 
will leave unredressed the institutional harm articulated by Nassar’s 
victims. 
If respondeat superior precludes vicarious criminal liability due 
to Nassar’s lack of intent to benefit the organization, another 
possibility could be direct liability for the organizations for aiding and 
abetting his conduct. Michigan has abolished the distinction between 
the principal and accessories to an offense, such that “[e]very person 
concerned in the commission of an offense, whether he directly 
 
 176. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §	750.136b(1)(d) (Westlaw through P.A.2019, No. 2 of 
2019 Reg. Sess.). 
 177. See id. §	750.136b(2)–(7). 
 178. Id. §	750.136b(1)(c). 
 179. Michigan Attorney General Bill Schuette has said that “[i]t is abundantly clear 
that a full and complete investigation of what happened at Michigan State University from 
the president’s office down, is required” and that the investigation will seek to determine 
“who knew what and when, who took action, who failed to take action.” Amy Held, State 
AG: Michigan State University Under Investigation in Ongoing Nassar Fallout, NPR (Jan. 
27, 2018, 4:57 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/01/27/581324655/state-ag-
michigan-state-university-under-investigation-in-ongoing-nassar-fallout [https://perma.cc/
C4XS-XHH6]. 
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commits the act constituting the offense or procures, counsels, aids, or 
abets in its commission may hereafter be prosecuted, indicted, tried 
and on conviction shall be punished as if he had directly committed 
such offense.”180 However, Michigan, like most jurisdictions, requires 
as an element of aiding and abetting that “the defendant intended the 
commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal 
intended its commission at the time [the defendant] gave aid and 
encouragement.”181 
Under this rule, coupled with respondeat superior, USA 
Gymnastics or MSU (were it not for sovereign immunity issues) could 
therefore be criminally liable if prosecutors could find an employee 
who intended or knew that Nassar intended to commit sexual assault. 
Institutional prosecution for aiding and abetting, then, faces the same 
problems as an effort to go after other individuals for child abuse: it 
may be very difficult to show actual knowledge of his misconduct by 
any particular person. These organizations can simply argue that their 
employees had the honest but mistaken (even if unreasonable) belief 
that Nassar’s methods were legitimately medical.182 Indeed, MSU 
already seems to be organizing that defense; its Board of Trustees 
released a letter reiterating the belief held by former U.S. Attorney 
Patrick Fitzgerald, MSU’s outside counsel, that “the evidence will 
show that no MSU official believed that Nassar committed sexual 
abuse prior to newspaper reports in the summer of 2016.”183 It is clear 
that the intent-to-benefit requirement of respondeat superior 
dramatically limits opportunities to hold at least USA Gymnastics 
criminally liable for the collective gross negligence that allowed so 
many young girls and women to be institutionally sexually assaulted. 
 
 180. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §	767.39 (Westlaw through P.A. 2019, No. 2 of 2019 
Reg. Sess.). 
 181. People v. Robinson, 715 N.W.2d 44, 48 (Mich. 2006) (alteration in original) 
(quoting People v. Moore, 679 N.W.2d 41, 49 (Mich. 2004)). 
 182. The most promising possibility for prosecutors aiming for either individual 
employees or the organizations is a theory of willful blindness. In cases where the 
defendant has intentionally kept himself unaware of facts that, had he known them, would 
have made him criminally liable, evidence of this fact can substitute for proof of actual 
knowledge. See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700–04 (9th Cir. 1976). While a 
showing of consciously intentional ignorance may also prove challenging, there is some 
evidence that federal courts, at least, have allowed the application of willful ignorance 
under circumstances better described as merely “reckless ignorance.” See Alexander F. 
Sarch, Beyond Willful Ignorance, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 97, 158–67 (2017). 
 183. Letter from the Bd. of Trs. for Mich. State Univ. to Bill Schuette, Attorney Gen. 
of Mich. (Jan. 19, 2018), https://msu.edu/ourcommitment/news/BOT%20Letter%20to%
20AG%20011918.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2Y7-D68X]. 
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The Nassar and Sandusky cases are hardly the only examples of 
what could properly be termed corporate sexual violence. The 
increasingly high profile of the #MeToo movement provides many 
others, but perhaps none so clear cut as the allegations against 
Miramax cofounder Harvey Weinstein and the institutional 
wrongdoing of his production companies.184 Sixteen former and 
current executives and assistants at Weinstein’s companies told The 
New Yorker that they were fully aware of the unwanted sexual 
contact Weinstein routinely imposed on women in professional 
settings.185 Employees identified “a culture of complicity at 
Weinstein’s places of business, with numerous people throughout his 
companies fully aware of his behavior but either abetting it or looking 
the other way.”186 Perhaps most disturbingly, some employees 
admitted to actively engaging in subterfuge to facilitate Weinstein’s 
assaults.187 While Weinstein himself is now being prosecuted, no 
charges have been filed as of yet against his companies. 
C. Corporate Homicide 
Sexual assault cases are unique insofar as it is difficult (though 
not impossible) to conceive of a set of circumstances where an 
employee’s abuse of his professional position for sexual gratification 
was intended to benefit his employer. A more common example of 
corporate violence that better fits the current criminal respondeat 
superior framework is homicide. Obviously, corporations and their 
employees that are engaged in dangerous work may commit homicide 
through reckless or unlawful behavior that was intended to benefit 
the corporation. Every mining disaster or oil spill that claims lives due 
to reckless or criminally negligent behavior falls into this category. 
During the 1980s, state legislatures began to amend their 
criminal codes to include corporations and organizations within the 
definition of “person” for the purpose of opening corporations up to 
criminal punishment for crimes of homicide.188 For example, Indiana 
 
 184. See generally Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault: Harvey 
Weinstein’s Accusers Tell Their Stories, NEW YORKER (Oct. 23, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/from-aggressive-overtures-to-sexual-assault-harvey-
weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories [https://perma.cc/5PN9-8VYY] (describing Weinstein’s 
behaviors as an “open secret to many in Hollywood and beyond”). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Death in the Workplace: Corporate Liability for Criminal 
Homicide, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 753, 758 (1987); James W. Harlow, 
Note, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: A Statutory Framework, 61 DUKE L.J. 
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prosecuted Ford Motor Company (albeit unsuccessfully) for reckless 
homicide after three women died when their Ford Pinto exploded 
after being rear ended.189 Illinois prosecuted Film Recovery Systems, 
Inc. for involuntary manslaughter after a worker died from acute 
cyanide toxicity due to working in an unventilated plant full of open 
vats of sodium cyanide.190 Yet, after this apparent uptick in 
prosecutorial activity, the drive to criminally prosecute corporations 
for homicide appears to have lost momentum.191 
There have been some difficulties in judicial construction of the 
offense. For example, while corporate homicide has been recognized 
by New York courts,192 it has been limited to cases where the cause of 
death was foreseeable.193 In People v. Warner-Lambert,194 six of the 
defendant-gum-manufacturer’s employees were killed when 
magnesium stearate residue accumulated on the plant’s machines and 
in the air, causing an explosion.195 The court held that 
[a]lthough [the defendants] were aware that there was a broad, 
undifferentiated risk of an explosion in consequence of ambient 
magnesium stearate dust arising from the procedures employed 
in [Warner-Lambert’s] manufacturing operations, the corporate 
and individual defendants may nonetheless not be criminally 
liable, on the theory of either reckless or negligent conduct, for 
the deaths of employees occasioned when such an explosion 
 
123, 131–32 (2011). But see State v. Pac. Powder Co., 360 P.2d 530, 532 (Or. 1961) (en 
banc) (holding that the Oregon homicide statute does not allow corporations to be 
prosecuted). 
 189. See Fatal Ford Pinto Crash in Indiana, HISTORY (Nov. 13, 2009), 
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/fatal-ford-pinto-crash-in-indiana [https://perma.cc/
H2LL-MKLS]; Larry Kramer, Jury Indicts Ford in Ind. Pinto Crash, WASH. POST (Sept. 
14, 1978), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1978/09/14/jury-indicts-
ford-in-ind-pinto-crash/39d186d8-b83a-44fd-88cf-d0e94f931045/?utm_term=.4e93f9484d83 
[https://perma.cc/HYF2-G33X (dark archive)]. 
 190. See People v. O’Neil, 550 N.E.2d 1090, 1092 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Barry Siegel, 
Officers Convicted: Murder Case a Corporate Landmark, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 15, 1985), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1985-09-15/news/mn-23348_1_corporate-officers [https://perma.cc/
Y43C-G6TQ]. The convictions of Film Recovery and its individual employees were 
eventually reversed on the basis that “the same conduct [was] used to support offenses 
[that had] mutually exclusive mental states.” O’Neil, 550 N.E.2d at 1092, 1101. 
 191. Harlow, supra note 188, at 134. For a detailed history of corporate homicide 
prosecutions, see id. at 128–34, 144–49. 
 192. See Peter T. Edelman, Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: The 
Need to Punish Both the Corporate Entity and Its Officers, 92 DICK. L. REV. 193, 206–07 
(1987). 
 193. See, e.g., People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 414 N.E.2d 660, 661, 666 (N.Y. 1980). 
 194. 414 N.E.2d 660 (N.Y. 1980). 
 195. See id. at 661–62. The compound is generally inert but can be combustible when 
airborne. Id. at 662. 
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occurred where the triggering cause thereof was neither 
foreseen nor foreseeable.196 
While the foreseeability requirement is arguably no different 
from the ordinary showing of objective fault necessary to prove an 
individual guilty of negligent homicide,197 some have argued that it 
raises unique causation dilemmas in the context of entity liability.198 
Specifically in cases where death was likely due to a corporation’s 
generalized negligence in the form of “latent failures,” under the rule 
in Warner-Lambert a corporation might nonetheless escape liability if 
the highly specific causal pathway to the actual death is not 
foreseeable.199 
Even in states without such precedent, however, critics say that 
prosecutors undercharge corporate offenders for homicide relative to 
the harm that they cause.200 Older data suggests that prosecutors seem 
likely to let large corporations off the hook to focus on smaller, 
privately held businesses.201 At the federal level, for example, in the 
forty years since Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act up until 2012, there were more than 400,000 workplace 
fatalities, yet fewer than eighty cases were criminally prosecuted.202 Of 
these, only approximately a dozen resulted in convictions.203 At least 
fifteen states, in addition to the federal government, have cases on 
record reflecting a corporation being prosecuted for manslaughter or 
negligent homicide.204 
 
 196. Id. at 661. 
 197. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE §	210.4(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (“Criminal 
homicide constitutes negligent homicide when it is committed negligently.”), with id. 
§	2.02(2)(d) (“A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense 
when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element 
exists or will result from his conduct.”). 
 198. See Harlow, supra note 188, at 146–49. 
 199. See id. at 147–49. 
 200. Id. at 134; see also The Case for a Corporate Homicide Law, CORP. CRIME REP. 
(July 16, 2013, 6:55 AM), https://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/
corporatehomicide07152013/ [https://perma.cc/KC4A-AYC9] (stating that only “rarely [do 
you] see a prosecutor bring criminal charges against a corporation for the death of a 
worker”). 
 201. See William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of 
Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1344 n.1 (1999) (“On average, small privately held 
businesses account for more than 95% of all corporate convictions each year.”). 
 202. Jordan B. Schwartz & Eric J. Conn, OSHA Criminal Referrals on the Rise, 
EPSTEIN BECKER & GREEN (Dec. 18, 2012), https://www.oshalawupdate.com/2012/
12/18/osha-criminal-referrals-on-the-rise/ [https://perma.cc/LJF7-NPWE]. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See Harlow, supra note 188, at 133 & n.65 (noting that fifteen states and the 
federal government have prosecuted corporations for manslaughter or criminally 
negligent homicide). 
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In short, corporate criminal liability appears underinclusive when 
it comes to the sorts of conduct most clearly at the heart of criminal 
law: grossly negligent and even intentional acts of violence against 
victims. In cases of sexual assault, it is clear that the intent to benefit 
element of criminal respondeat superior blocks corporate liability as a 
matter of law. In cases of manslaughter and negligent homicide, the 
causes of underinclusivity appear to be confusing state statutes and 
potentially prosecutorial reluctance to pursue criminal charges on the 
basis of an overbroad liability standard. To address the ways in which 
corporate criminal liability is underinclusive, we may need a standard 
that also addresses the ways in which it is overinclusive. 
III.  TORT ANSWERS 
Unlike its newer criminal counterpart, the tort doctrine of 
respondeat superior has had the advantage of common law 
development across various jurisdictions over time. That tort law has 
remained so largely a creature of the common law allows it to change 
in accordance with social need while retaining internal coherence—
or, as Roscoe Pound optimistically put it, “in accordance with fixed 
and definite rules in every way comparable to those which determine 
the events of nature.”205 An attempt to create a more coherent 
standard for attributing criminal liability through respondeat superior 
should include a look at how courts have refined the doctrine in the 
tort context. 
A. The Purposes of Respondeat Superior in Tort and Criminal Law 
Both criminal and tort law can be said to redress a form of 
wrong.206 Both systems are also motivated by competing utilitarian 
concerns such as deterrence.207 In criminal law, the conflict between 
 
 205. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 163 (Transaction Publishers 
1999) (1963); see also O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (Boston, Little, Brown, 
and Co. 1881) (describing how the law adapts over time in response to new realities). 
 206. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 (“[Private wrongs] are an 
infringement or privation of the private or civil rights belonging to individuals, considered 
as individuals; and are thereupon frequently termed civil injuries: [public wrongs] are a 
breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affect the whole community, 
considered as a community; and are distinguished by the harsher appellation of crimes and 
misdemeanors.”); cf. G. W. F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §	220 
(Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821) (arguing 
that, while revenge vindicates a victim’s subjective interest in retribution, only a criminal 
prosecution in a court vindicates the public’s universal moral interest). 
 207. Cf. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 101–10 (London, 
Robert Heward 1830) (discussing the role of imprisonment); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE 
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 39–45 (1968) (discussing the role of deterrence); 
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justifications for punishment is quite familiar. The moral purposes of 
criminal law, such as retribution and denunciation, tend to be the 
flashpoints of public discourse.208 Yet policymakers and criminal 
courts take utilitarian goals equally into account, and there is a deep 
law-and-economics literature on the appropriate levels of punishment 
necessary to achieve optimal deterrence.209 Certainly both sets of 
goals, moral and utilitarian, are constitutionally acceptable purposes 
of punishment, even though they are often famously at odds.210 
Tort law is similarly fraught with tensions and outright conflicts 
between moral and utilitarian justifications for liability. 
Instrumentalists have been deeply influential in tort law, where 
resource allocation,211 risk distribution,212 compensation,213 and 
deterrence214 are frequently cited goals. Perhaps most famously, 
Learned Hand’s formulation of negligence sets the level of care 
required to avoid fault as that which will theoretically achieve optimal 
deterrence of risk; a function of the burden of adequate precautions, 
the probability of loss, and the resulting injury if that loss occurs.215 In 
contrast to negligence, strict liability attaches regardless of how much 
 
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33–34 (1972) 
(proposing a “hypothesis that liability for negligence is designed to bring about an efficient 
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 208. See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol, Hard Choices and Shifted Burdens: American Crime 
and American Justice at the End of the Century, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 507–11 
(1997) (book review) (noting that “since the mid-seventies retribution has come back with 
a vengeance, enjoying today a greater prominence in public discourse over crime and 
punishment than at any other time in post-war America” (footnote omitted)). 
 209. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Penalties and the Economics of Criminal 
Law, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 175, 175–76 (2005); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of 
the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1195 (1985). 
 210. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 307–08 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 211. See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 
70 YALE L.J. 499, 500–17 (1961). 
 212. Id. at 517–27. 
 213. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §	901(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1979) 
(identifying “compensation, indemnity, or restitution for harms” as purposes of tort 
liability); Mark Geistfeld, Negligence, Compensation, and the Coherence of Tort Law, 91 
GEO. L.J. 585, 589–90 (2003). 
 214. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§	6 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (stating that negligence liability supplies an incentive to 
deter unjust behavior); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §	901(c) (AM. LAW INST. 
1979) (identifying the deterrence of wrongful conduct as a purpose of tort liability). 
 215. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (setting forth 
the Learned Hand formulation of negligence). 
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care the defendant has taken, and its proponents typically cite the 
instrumentalist goals of risk distribution and resource allocation.216 
That said, rights-based tort theorists have made significant 
headway, particularly in the development of fault doctrines.217 Similar 
to moral-based retributivists in criminal law, rights-based theorists 
define reasonable care under a negligence standard with reference to 
moral or social norms, with the relevant question being what level of 
concern individuals ought to be entitled to receive from others with 
respect to their safety.218 Ernest Weinrib argues that negligence is the 
appropriate standard for responsibility (as opposed to either extreme 
of subjective fault or strict liability) because it balances two aspects of 
the relationship of risk to human action: “the legitimacy of action” 
and “the illegitimacy of indifference to the suffering that action can 
cause.”219 By this standard, according to rights-based theorists, the 
court can measure the entitlement of a particular plaintiff to 
reparation from a particular defendant.220 
Interestingly, despite the well-observed conflict between 
negligence and strict liability as theories of tort responsibility—and, 
indeed, the plurality of conflicting justifications for each of these 
theories221—certain discrete doctrines have survived the test of time. 
It has been suggested, in fact, that a tort doctrine can only endure in 
the common law if it can be reconciled in some way with the concerns 
of both instrumentalist and rights-based theories of tort.222 One such 
durable doctrine is respondeat superior, and its development is thus 
particularly salient to its counterpart in the similarly conflicted field 
of criminal law. 
 
 216. See Calabresi, supra note 211, at 541; see also Joseph H. King, Jr., A Goals-
Oriented Approach to Strict Tort Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activities, 48 
BAYLOR L. REV. 341, 349–58 (1996). 
 217. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Strict Liability in Negligence, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 271, 
273 (2012) (arguing that “tort law doctrines may need to satisfy both instrumental and 
rights-based concerns in order to be stable and persistent”); cf. GREGORY & KALVEN, 
supra note 16, at 689 (claiming that “[t]he central policy issue in tort law is whether the 
principal criterion of liability is to be based on individual fault or on a wide distribution of 
risk and loss”). 
 218. Abraham, supra note 217, at 274. 
 219. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 151 (1995). 
 220. Id. at 155; see also John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 
88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 946 (2010) (“Tort law provides victims with an avenue of civil 
recourse against those who have committed relational and injurious wrongs against them.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 221. See Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law 
Strict Liability, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1285, 1309 (2001). 
 222. See Abraham, supra note 217, at 299–301. 
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Vicarious liability has been called the “most ancient and 
ubiquitous form of strict liability,”223 with respondeat superior—a 
type of vicarious liability—holding “an employer .	.	. liable, despite 
having no fault whatsoever, for the acts of its employees taken within 
the scope of their employment.”224 As mentioned, strict liability arises 
wherever a defendant may be held liable for a loss without any 
showing of fault. It is liability imposed regardless of whether it would 
have been cost effective under Learned Hand’s formula to take 
precautions that would have eliminated the harm.225 Justifications for 
strict liability as an alternative to negligence turn heavily on the 
instrumentalist goal of risk distribution: a commercial injurer is in the 
best position to insure against risk or otherwise broadly distribute the 
costs of nonnegligently caused accidents among itself, its consumers, 
and its other stakeholders.226 Furthermore, Guido Calabresi has 
argued that strict liability will generally achieve better resource 
allocation by causing the price of goods to reflect all of the costs of 
their production, so demand can more accurately reflect how much of 
something people truly want.227 Strict liability also serves other 
instrumentalist goals, such as reducing the overall amount of a 
dangerous activity engaged in (which negligence cannot generally 
reach) and reducing the information and error costs accompanying a 
jury’s factual determination of fault.228 
There is also at least one moral, or rights-based, justification for 
strict liability that seems particularly relevant to respondeat superior: 
the idea that those who benefit from an activity should bear its 
costs.229 Liability, according to this theory, arises not due to any 
instrumental purpose but due to the relationship between the actor 
who imposed the harm (its beneficiary) and its victim. As Kenneth 
Abraham notes, however, this theory alone cannot explain a 
manufacturer’s strict liability for harm to customers—arising, for 
example, in products liability cases—because customers themselves 
 
 223. Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability, 55 MD. 
L. REV. 1190, 1198 (1996). 
 224. Hamilton v. Carell, 243 F.3d 992, 1001 (6th Cir. 2001) (first citing Jones v. 
Federated Fin. Reserve Corp., 144 F.3d 961, 965 (6th Cir. 1998); and then citing KEETON 
ET AL., supra note 116, §	69, at 499–501). 
 225. Abraham, supra note 217, at 274–75. 
 226. See id. at 280. 
 227. Calabresi, supra note 211, at 505. 
 228. Abraham, supra note 217, at 276–80. 
 229. See Keating, supra note 221, at 1287; see also Abraham, supra note 217, at 281 
(“The notion at the core of [the benefit] theory is that those who benefit from engaging in 
an activity should rightly bear the costs associated with the activity.”). 
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benefit from the manufacturer’s enterprise.230 He contends, therefore, 
that some instrumental theory is necessary to fully justify strict 
liability.231 
Weinrib makes a somewhat different rights-based defense of 
respondeat superior as a discrete doctrine. He argues that it is not 
true strict liability at all based on the fact that, while “employers 
cannot plead their own reasonable care in selecting or supervising the 
employee, the employee’s exercise of reasonable care precludes 
liability.”232 In other words, respondeat superior should not be seen as 
a no-fault liability rule but as a means of channeling fault in cases 
where a “faulty actor is sufficiently integrated into [an] enterprise” 
and his “faulty act is sufficiently close to the assigned task” such that 
they form an integrated legal persona.233 Once one accepts this 
conceptual integration, one can then return to balancing the interests 
of the employer-acting-through-the-employee and the injured party. 
On the whole, however, respondeat superior has seen primarily 
instrumentalist justifications in the modern era.234 Tort theorists have 
advanced risk spreading as a primary justification for holding an 
employer liable without fault for the torts of its employees.235 This 
immediately poses a challenge for any application of respondeat 
superior to the criminal context: most of the time, criminal law is not 
about pure risk spreading, insofar as a criminal punishment does not 
usually make a private victim whole, except on the occasions—still 
inconsistently arising—in which a court imposes restitution as part of 
a sentence.236 Furthermore, the distortive effects of the role of 
prosecutorial discretion in our criminal system alter the allocation of 
risk in ways that are difficult to predict. 
It is, however, possible to think of risk spreading in terms of 
nonmonetary currency. As Dan Kahan puts it, “[W]hen a corporation 
is subjected to the stigmatizing effect of criminal conviction[,] what 
the corporation loses is recovered, at least in part, by the public in the 
 
 230. Abraham, supra note 217, at 281. 
 231. Id. (“For answers to these questions, reference to incentive-based or insurance-
based arguments is likely to be necessary.”). 
 232. WEINRIB, supra note 219, at 185. 
 233. Id. at 187. 
 234. See Rabin, supra note 223, at 1199. 
 235. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 22–28 (1967); 2 FOWLER V. 
HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 1365, 1368–71 (1956) (discussing 
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for vicarious liability is accident prevention); cf. Calabresi, supra note 211, at 499–500 
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 236. See Cortney E. Lollar, What Is Criminal Restitution?, 100 IOWA L. REV. 93, 95–97 
(2014). 
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form of the satisfaction that citizens take in seeing the corporation’s 
crime authoritatively repudiated.”237 In other words, the social 
meaning of criminal punishment has a value which courts and 
policymakers should factor into utilitarian cost-benefit analyses. 
Perhaps, then, risk spreading can be a coherent benefit of criminal 
punishment via respondeat superior if it can be argued that corporate 
employers are better able to bear the risk of the stigma of conviction 
than the general public is able to bear the expressive costs of failing to 
see a corporation punished. The biggest challenge to this argument, of 
course, is that the criminal punishment of a corporate employer, in 
cases where it has no fault, may not carry much social meaning as 
compared to prosecution of an individual employee who does have 
the requisite mens rea. And while an employer may generally be 
better positioned than an employee to compensate for financial 
harms, this is not necessarily true or even coherent for expressive 
harms. In other words, it is difficult to identify a purely expressive 
value served by criminalizing a truly faultless entity. This fact suggests 
that a negligence standard for corporate fault would—theoretically—
not only serve the instrumental goal of optimal deterrence but would 
also better capture the denunciative benefits Kahan identifies as a 
purpose of corporate punishment. 
For the moment, it is sufficient to recognize that similar 
categories of justification motivate both the criminal and tort systems 
but that the expressive justification does more work in criminal law 
than in tort and the risk distribution justification somewhat less. This 
is, perhaps, a major reason why respondeat superior has proven so 
unwieldy upon importation to the criminal arena. With that in mind, 
we turn to how courts have dealt with the potential over- and 
underinclusiveness of respondeat superior in tort cases. 
B. Common Law Refinements of Respondeat Superior 
Earlier I reviewed the extensive critical literature on the 
potential overinclusiveness of the respondeat superior standard in 
criminal law. Particularly under the federal criminal code, with its 
voluminous list of strict liability offenses, the standard can impute 
criminal liability to faultless employers for the actions of employees 
who were themselves acting without fault. At the other extreme end 
of the spectrum, it can criminalize corporations for employees’ 
offenses, such as fraud and bribery, that require a high standard of 
subjective intent regardless of the corporation’s collective fault—but 
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only where the employee was motivated by an intent to benefit her 
employer. Generally speaking, the scope-of-employment doctrine has 
been understood to limit vicarious liability to cases where torts are 
‘“caused’ by the business enterprise.”238 Yet on the tort side, courts 
have done more to resolve the potential over- and underinclusiveness 
of the doctrine. 
1.  Unintentional Torts and Overinclusiveness 
The potential overinclusiveness of no-fault corporate liability has 
been magnified in the criminal context by the proliferation of no-fault 
federal criminal offenses. When it comes to tort law, however, the 
effects of civil respondeat superior must be read against the 
background of general tort law, in which negligence doctrine has 
come—to some extent controversially—to replace no-fault liability in 
cases of unintentional torts.239 While many scholars have argued that 
the boundary between strict liability and negligence is more porous 
than conventional wisdom suggests,240 courts generally only overtly 
apply strict liability in a couple of contexts, such as strict liability for 
abnormally dangerous activities (“SLADA”) and products liability.241 
Historically, the common law has justified the predominance of 
negligence liability through the notion of reciprocity. When a party is 
injured by a reasonable risk, he cannot get compensation under a 
negligence regime because “[h]e receives his compensation for such 
damage[s] by the general good, in which he shares, and the right 
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which he has to [engage in similarly risky conduct].”242 Implicit in this 
notion are the ideas that compensation for one party necessarily 
limits the liberty of the other and that negligence strikes a kind of 
balance that maintains the greater good. (The contours of which, of 
course, are necessarily and perhaps imperfectly defined by jury 
determinations of “the reasonable.”) 
Mark Geistfeld has argued that the reciprocity principle can also 
explain strict liability for SLADA: “Highly significant risks created by 
uncommon activities are not reciprocal and do not merge into the 
background level of social risk. For these risks, the negligence rule 
does not provide an adequate reciprocal benefit for potential 
victims.”243 If we apply this reciprocity value to respondeat superior as 
a strict liability doctrine, we might say that there is no reciprocity 
between a complex entity and its potential victims. In the same way 
that most people do not engage in highly dangerous activities and 
therefore do not benefit from the reciprocal benefit of having their 
own liability bounded by negligence, an injured person is not a 
commercial entity with employees and would only in rare cases 
reciprocally benefit from a fault limitation on his or her own vicarious 
liability. 
Yet most of the actual tort claims for which an entity might be 
held vicariously liable sound, themselves, in negligence due to the 
systemic preference for tolerating “reasonable” risks based upon the 
reciprocity principle. Furthermore, even in the “special” cases of 
SLADA and products liability, the operation of strict liability has 
come to be softened around the edges by negligence doctrine. For 
example, with respect to abnormally dangerous activities, the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts says that strict liability may be 
inapplicable when the high degree of risk can be eliminated by the 
exercise of reasonable care.244 In a 1999 study of 100 decisions, Gerald 
Boston found that rarely do plaintiffs raise successful SLADA claims, 
due to courts determining that “the negligence system can function 
effectively in enforcing safety concerns associated with the activity.”245 
And with respect to products liability, the Restatement (Third) of 
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 243. Geistfeld, supra note 213, at 616. 
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Torts proposed to resolve the question of what constitutes a “defect” 
with reference to whether there exists a safer alternative, the omission 
of which was unreasonable, thus shifting even products liability law 
away from strict liability and into the field of negligence.246 Thus, 
while respondeat superior itself remains a strict liability rule, an 
employee must generally have been negligent in order to bind the 
employer through unintentional conduct because the backdrop tort 
law has—unlike federal criminal law—moved so far away from no-
fault liability.247 
Finally, both strict liability and negligence jurisprudence have 
been influenced in ways particularly relevant to respondeat superior 
by the concept of “enterprise liability.”248 Enterprise liability rests on 
the premise that “(1) an enterprise has superior risk-spreading 
capacity compared to victims who would otherwise bear the costs of 
accidents, and (2) an enterprise is generally better placed to respond 
to the safety incentives created by liability rules than is the party 
suffering harm.”249 While George Priest initially identified the theory 
to describe the strict-liability origins of products liability,250 
subsequent scholarship has demonstrated the influence of enterprise 
liability on negligence as well.251 Most notably, Robert Rabin has 
argued that, despite its emphasis on risk allocation, enterprise liability 
has come to serve not as a mechanism for “enthroning strict liability 
as a replacement” for negligence but as a “different way of thinking 
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about the social function of the tort system—in particular, viewing 
tort as a redistributive and regulatory mechanism—that has evolved 
independently of doctrinal change.”252 
To illustrate this doctrine’s effects on the structure of negligence 
law, Rabin points to the 1976 California Supreme Court decision in 
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California,253 in which the court 
held that a therapist had a duty to warn a potential victim of death 
threats made by a patient in the course of therapy despite competing 
considerations of therapist-patient privilege.254 Rabin points out that 
because “therapists are in the business of treating disturbed patients, 
some subset of whom have violent propensities,” they are “singularly 
positioned to take reasonable steps to warn when this occupational 
hazard arises.”255 Rabin argues that this outcome does not turn on a 
risk-spreading function, otherwise a dentist or bartender would be 
equally liable for warning of overheard risks as they would still be 
better situated than the oblivious victim to prevent the harm.256 
Rather, the law appears concerned with deterrence “grounded in the 
notion of intrinsic occupational risk.”257 
Rabin goes on to identify the thread of enterprise liability 
throughout negligence law with other examples of professional 
liability premised on the foreseeability of particular sorts of harm, 
including relaxation of negligence standards in medical malpractice 
law and the liability of auditors to foreseeably injured third parties 
who rely on misrepresentations about a client’s financial state.258 In 
cases involving auditors, Rabin notes that, while some states have 
rejected foreseeability of harm as a touchstone of liability, citing the 
potentially “crushing liability” possible under such a standard, many 
have adopted it for enterprise liability-based reasons.259 In so doing, 
for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court asked “[w]hy should an 
innocent reliant party be forced to carry the weighty burden of an 
accountant’s professional malpractice” and whether “a rule of 
foreseeability [would] elevate the cautionary techniques of the 
accounting profession.”260 
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To summarize then, the potential overinclusiveness of the 
respondeat superior standard in tort law has been muted by the 
simultaneous movement of tort law generally into the field of 
negligence. Furthermore, to the extent that the risk-spreading 
purpose of respondeat superior has gained traction through the 
ideology of enterprise liability, it has taken the form of a 
foreseeability analysis. Even in applying negligence standards, courts 
have questioned what sorts of risks attendant to the particular 
enterprise are foreseeable to the defendant. While controversial as a 
potentially harmful expansion of tort liability in cases such as those of 
the negligent auditors, the foreseeability standard nonetheless 
combines the goal of shifting risk to the beneficiaries of an enterprise 
with the check provided by a reasonableness inquiry as to the 
objective foreseeability of harm. 
2.  Intentional Torts and Underinclusiveness 
At the other end of the spectrum, the law of respondeat superior 
liability for intentional torts has evolved as well. Unlike in criminal 
law, in tort cases, courts and commentators have been divided on 
whether an employee’s intent to serve his master is a necessary 
precondition to vicarious liability.261 Most notably, the frolic and 
detour rule excludes from vicarious liability employee conduct 
actuated for a purely private purpose.262 Yet the dual-purpose 
doctrine allows a master to be liable for a servant’s negligent conduct 
even in situations in which the servant’s predominant motive was to 
benefit himself.263 And the Restatement (Second) of Agency makes an 
exception for torts committed outside the scope of employment 
where the master itself has been negligent or reckless.264 Due in part 
to the fact that intentional torts do not always serve the master’s 
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(“Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is .	.	. too little actuated 
by a purpose to serve the master.”), with WARREN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW 
OF AGENCY §	87(A) (1964) (“The ultimate question in the minds of the judges is whether 
it is just to make the master’s enterprise bear the loss caused by the particular act .	.	.	. It is 
just to do this if it can be said rationally that the employment is the primary cause of the 
tort.”). 
 262. 20 LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY: ACTIONS, 
DEFENSES, AND DAMAGES §	95.05[3][a] (Matthew Bender rev. ed., 2013) (“If [conduct] is 
.	.	. for a purely private purpose or a ‘frolic’ of the employee’s own, no liability attaches.” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
 263. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §	236, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
 264. Id. at §	219(2). 
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benefit,265 some jurisdictions only rarely recognize an employee’s 
intentional torts as the basis for respondeat superior liability.266 
Yet in many jurisdictions, the so-called motive test has given way 
to the question of how much responsibility an enterprise should take 
for injuries that may be typical of its business.267 This thread of 
jurisprudence is typified by Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United 
States,268 where the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit famously held the U.S. government liable for the drunken 
property damage caused by its sailor on shore leave, despite the 
obvious lack of motive to benefit the employer, on the theory that “a 
business enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for accidents 
which may fairly be said to be characteristic of its activities” and the 
fact that the sailor’s conduct “was not so ‘unforeseeable’ as to make it 
unfair to charge the Government with responsibility.”269 Numerous 
other examples of vicarious liability for intentional torts unmotivated 
by intent to serve an employer can be found in state law.270 
More specifically, civil courts are beginning to hold employers 
vicariously liable for the sexual torts of their employees regardless of 
motivation to benefit in cases where the plaintiff can allege a 
sufficiently close relationship between the harm suffered and the 
defendant’s position as an employee. For example, the D.C. Circuit 
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held that a jury could impose vicarious liability on a trucking 
company for its employee’s rape of a customer due to the fact that the 
deliveryman’s “badge of employment” allowed him to get into the 
victim’s home.271 Considering a case involving allegations of sexual 
abuse by the staff of a psychiatric hospital, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court eliminated the “motivation to serve” element, noting that “it 
would be a rare situation where a wrongful act would actually further 
the employer’s business,” and thus concluded that motivation was 
irrelevant to the availability of vicarious liability.272 The Oregon 
Supreme Court announced that, in a case of sexual abuse of a minor 
by a priest, the question was not whether the sexual assault itself was 
in the course of employment but, rather, whether the priest’s conduct 
leading up to the assault was in the course of employment.273 The 
court found that a reasonable jury could conclude that the priest’s 
legitimate employment-related actions “were a necessary precursor to 
the sexual abuse” and that the sexual assaults therefore “were a direct 
outgrowth of and were engendered by conduct that was within the 
scope of [the priest’s] employment.”274 The Ninth Circuit applied the 
Oregon rule in holding that a plaintiff “sufficiently alleged that [the 
priest] was an employee of the Holy See acting within the ‘scope of 
his employment’ under Oregon law” and that the acts come within 
the “tortious act exception” to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity 
Act.275 The court held that the church could be vicariously liable on 
the alleged facts because the plaintiff had “c[o]me to know [the 
defendant] as his priest, counselor and spiritual adviser,” and the 
priest had “used his ‘position of authority’ to ‘engage in harmful 
sexual contact.’”276 Other examples abound.277 Some use the Bushey 
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logic of foreseeability,278 while others turn on a finding that the 
employee’s sexual misconduct arose from or was in some way related 
to his or her essential duties.279 The Supreme Court has even 
commented on the increasingly broad tort liability of employers for 
the sexual crimes of employees unmotivated to serve them, 
contrasting it with the more parsimonious vicarious liability standard 
governing a Title VII claim.280 
It should be recognized that these new developments do not 
mean that courts now consistently apply vicarious liability to the 
sexual torts of employees—far from it. Martha Chamallas, who has 
made the most comprehensive scholarly critique of the field, notes 
that “tort law gives no crisp answer to the question of whether a 
business is vicariously liable for the sexual torts committed by its 
employees” and criticizes as “sexual exceptionalism” the fact that 
“[m]any courts continue to treat sexual abuse cases as exceptional, 
echoing the sentiments of old-fashioned (pre-1970s) criminal laws 
that once approached rape and sexual assault as qualitatively 
different from other forms of violence.”281 
Nonetheless, unlike in criminal law, tort respondeat superior has 
at least begun to move away from an intent-to-benefit requirement 
that in some jurisdictions had wholly precluded vicarious liability for 
intentional torts. This shift to a focus on the relationship between the 
tort and the employer’s enterprise demonstrates that courts are 
increasingly thinking of respondeat superior as a form of causation. 
This focus on the nexus between the harm caused and the employer’s 
business could resolve the underinclusiveness issues in criminal 
respondeat superior as well. 
C. The Project of Doctrinal Borrowing 
Before moving on to consider these tort developments in the 
criminal arena, one must first ask: Is it appropriate to do so? This part 
began with a consideration of the very different purposes of and 
justifications for tort and criminal liability, which may suggest that the 
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 278. See, e.g., Mary M., 814 P.2d at 1350–51. 
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whole endeavor is flawed. The law of criminal procedure has already 
seen a notable example of courts “borrowing” from tort law to create 
a new constitutional standard: the importation of the good faith 
defense to a constitutional tort claim against a police officer into the 
application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.282 That move 
was controversial insofar as it applied the jurisprudential logic of one 
remedy to another with entirely different aims and design: the logic of 
a personal defense to a constitutional tort action for damages 
recoverable from an individual, applied to a remedy for a criminal 
procedural violation to which no individual is personally entitled, 
whose cost is borne by the system.283 
Jennifer Laurin has noted that the convergence of the good faith 
defense between the constitutional tort and constitutional procedural 
realms presents the particular problem of simultaneously shutting 
down two remedies for the same violation—on occasions that the 
officer’s conduct meets the good faith test, the accused can neither get 
tort compensation for the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights 
nor have the seized evidence excluded from his trial.284 Laurin 
concludes that, to the extent that the case law “facilitates complete 
convergence of the good faith exception with immunity doctrine, such 
that its culpability test applies across the range of Fourth Amendment 
contexts, this new conduct rule will often .	.	. set the bar lower than 
what the Court has held the Constitution itself to require.”285 By 
contrast, Nelson Tebbe and Robert Tsai defend constitutional 
borrowing on rule-of-law grounds.286 They say it promotes 
“generality, participation, and accountability,” in part by “[c]reating a 
shared repertoire of persuasive moves” that will empower citizens 
and officials to recognize governing principles.287 Scholars in other 
fields have made similar arguments about the values of 
transsubstantive borrowing generally.288 
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In considering the propriety of borrowing from tort 
jurisprudence to flesh out a criminal mens rea standard, note that the 
proverbial cow is already out of the barn. Respondeat superior has 
already been imported into criminal law; what remains is only to 
consider whether further recourse to tort law to develop the doctrine 
runs into any of the problems attendant to applying a constitutional 
tort defense to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Like the 
good faith defense, respondeat superior occupies two distinct settings. 
In one, the corporation faces criminal punishment, and the public 
stands to gain expressive redress for the harms the entity has imposed 
and potential deterrence of future similar offenses. In the other, an 
individual plaintiff seeks compensation for harms he has personally 
suffered at the hands of the corporation’s employees. 
But unlike the good faith defense, the question of vicarious 
liability does not implicate dual constitutional remedies. Rather, it is a 
way for the law to define a party on the same side of the “v.” in 
separate criminal and civil matters. The victims of that party’s 
violation—the individual defendant and the public—are distinct (even 
assuming there are in fact parallel litigations in the first place). Thus, 
using the contours of tort jurisprudence to shape a criminal mens rea 
standard is not going to doubly limit any one party’s remedies, much 
less any party’s constitutional remedies. Indeed, it is likely to serve 
the rule-of-law purpose identified by Tebbe and Tsai, given the 
current state of affairs in which the power to label a corporation as a 
criminal currently rests almost solely in the hands of prosecutors. 
That is not to say, however, that we can or should borrow in full cloth. 
A workable standard should adapt the developed principles of tort 
respondeat superior to a distinctively criminal setting and the 
preexisting rules of criminal mens rea. 
IV.  A NEW STANDARD 
The foregoing has shown that a new standard for criminal 
respondeat superior, if it is to benefit from the development of the 
doctrine in tort, should (1) take into account the differing importance 
of risk-spreading as a purpose of liability as between tort and crime, 
(2) be tempered by a component of negligence and/or foreseeability, 
and (3) replace the intent-to-benefit requirement with a causation 
analysis. I have elsewhere stated in passing that my preferred 
corporate mens rea standard would limit criminal liability to cases 
where a corporation committed criminal negligence; that is, when it 
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has “failed to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk of 
misconduct occurring and take reasonable measures to prevent it.”289 
This part expands upon this standard and demonstrates how it would 
look in action. 
My standard takes as a starting point a negligence-based model, 
such as that proposed by Weissman and Newman.290 Yet it seeks to 
reduce uncertainty and vagueness for defendants on the one hand and 
the moral hazards of a safe harbor on the other by applying the 
doctrinal developments from the respondeat superior doctrine in tort. 
Specifically, I propose that corporate criminal liability require three 
elements: (1) proof that a crime occurred, regardless of whether any 
individual employee had the intent to benefit the corporation; (2) an 
omission by the corporation to take reasonable steps to prevent the 
crime; and (3) proof that the substantial risk of such a crime was 
objectively foreseeable given the nature of the employer’s enterprise. 
The three proposed elements work together to expand the 
corporate liability analysis away from solely what the individual 
employee intended and toward the question that more properly 
captures corporate harm: What could the entity collectively have 
foreseen and prevented its agent from doing in the scope of 
employment, such that the crime can be said to have been caused by a 
corporate omission? In answering this question, I draw upon several 
of the existing proposals for alternative corporate mens rea standards 
already discussed but propose a coherent test that improves, rather 
than fully supplants, the respondeat superior test. 
As I have argued previously, the idea that a collective omission 
to take steps to prevent a crime constitutes a valid form of criminal 
mens rea runs into some of the same problems posed in the first place 
by the very concept of criminal negligence generally.291 In a debate 
with H.L.A. Hart, J.W.C. Turner proposed that the basic idea of 
criminal, or “gross,” negligence is problematic.292 The concept of 
negligence, he argued, requires that a negligent action be inherently 
unconscious—a failure to meet a standard rather than an act of will.293 
Following this reasoning, negligence cannot, therefore, be mens rea 
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because it is inherently unintended.294 By contrast, if an ostensibly 
negligent act is done with any awareness of the consequences, it 
becomes recklessness, rendering the category of criminal negligence 
irrelevant.295 This argument is intellectually akin to the claim that a 
corporation cannot unilaterally “intend” its conduct and should 
therefore not be subject to the moral condemnation of the criminal 
law. 
Yet the criminal law routinely recognizes criminal negligence, 
albeit controversially. The Model Penal Code defines criminal 
negligence as a lack of awareness of “a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that the material element [of an offense] exists or will result from 
[the actor’s] conduct” and that the “failure to perceive it” must 
represent “a gross deviation from the standard of care that a 
reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.”296 
Furthermore, there is a valid theoretical basis for doing so. The idea 
of importing a negligence standard into the criminal law is nothing 
new; for all the theoretical debate that has surrounded it, it is hard at 
work every time someone is prosecuted for criminally negligent 
homicide or involuntary manslaughter. And conceptually it is a 
relatively easy fit to apply to a corporation as a condition of vicarious 
liability. 
Patrick O’Neil has described the concept of criminal negligence 
as “non-proximate mens rea,” which is 
one or more points of choice when the perpetrator either chose 
to indulge in the habits of mind which ultimately led to patterns 
of negligence or (more likely) chose not to take steps to correct 
patterns of negligence or patterns of mental inadvertency 
having the potential to lead to acts of negligence.297 
So, for example, when someone chooses to become intoxicated and 
subsequently kills a person on the drive home, his conscious intent (to 
get drunk) may have been temporally removed from the actual actus 
reus (the reckless driving resulting in death, which was itself 
inadvertent). It is on this basis that the criminal law has no problem 
pairing the remote subjective mens rea of intent to drink with the 
foreseeable, if inadvertent, actus reus of killing someone while driving 
drunk. 
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The corporate context poses an additional conceptual challenge: 
unlike the case of the drunk driver, here, the criminally negligent 
state of mind arises from a different legal entity than the actual 
perpetrator of the actus reus. Nonetheless, by examining the effects of 
corporate omissions according to familiar principles of causation, it is 
possible to formulate a test whereby an individual employee’s mens 
rea may be more justifiably attributed to recognizably criminal 
misconduct of the corporate employer. I propose, in short, that the 
rule of respondeat superior is justified where a negligent corporate 
omission is a legal cause of the relevant crime. 
A. A Crime, Regardless of Intent to Benefit 
The standard begins with proof of individual liability, similar to 
the existing respondeat superior standard, but with a couple of key 
differences. First, the doctrine of collective knowledge—
inconsistently applied under the current regime—makes much more 
sense where some form of genuinely corporate fault exists. As 
discussed above, scattered knowledge among various employees 
would not seem to justify corporate criminal liability on its face where 
there would be no way for management to be aware of all of the 
disparately held pieces of knowledge. Yet if it can also be shown, as 
discussed below, that a substantial risk of this state of affairs would 
have been foreseeable to a reasonable person undertaking the 
corporation’s business, and that no reasonable steps had been taken 
by anyone in the corporation to prevent it, criminal liability can be 
justified. 
Second, the showing of corporate fault required by the second 
and third prongs of the test should eliminate the old requirement that 
the offending employee have acted with the intent to benefit the 
corporation. We have seen how courts applying respondeat superior 
in tort cases have begun to shift away from this understanding of the 
doctrine to instead scrutinize the nexus between the employer’s 
enterprise and the resulting crime. Where a criminal has used his 
status as an employee to commit an offense, if such an offense was 
reasonably foreseeable given the employer’s business, respondeat 
superior should operate to impose criminal liability. 
B. The Omission of Reasonable Steps to Prevent the Crime 
In Part II, I discussed a number of proposals that looked to 
preoffense conduct by the corporation in the form of inadequate 
practices and procedures that failed to prevent the relevant offense. I 
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noted that such proposals have been rightfully criticized for tying 
criminal mens rea to conduct other than the actual actus reus—the 
specific action of the employee. Yet the focus on preoffense 
negligence does at least capture conduct that can be properly termed 
“corporate.” Specifically, while it is difficult to formulate a rule 
whereby a corporation can be said to have collectively acted, it is 
fairly easy to conceive of a collective omission. The question becomes 
whether anyone in the corporation had taken reasonable steps to 
prevent an offense from occurring. 
In a corporation, composed of many actors engaging in 
cooperative behavior over extended temporal periods, the collective 
failure of any and all corporate actors to prevent substantially 
foreseeable criminal misconduct constitutes an identifiable omission 
that does not require applying individual states of mind to a corporate 
body. Such a collective failure can properly be said to be at least a 
but-for cause of the misconduct. It does not require a theory of 
collective intent to determine what steps—if taken by anyone in a 
corporation—could reasonably have prevented a crime and conclude 
that they were taken by no one. And the same concept of 
nonproximate mens rea that implicitly justifies criminal negligence 
generally also justifies pairing that negligence to the subsequent 
criminal misconduct of an employee. Yet but-for causation alone is an 
inadequate basis for criminal liability, which brings us to the final 
step. 
C. The Objective Foreseeability of the Crime 
To result in criminal liability, an omission must not only be a but-
for cause of the prohibited harm but also a proximate cause. While 
proximate causation is, in and of itself, a topic rife with doctrinal 
confusion,298 American courts generally follow the Model Penal Code 
in cases of criminal negligence and require that the prohibited harm 
be foreseeable to the wrongdoer.299 So, for example, if my taxi driver 
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fails to pick me up on time and I am forced to take a later flight, 
which crashes, he is indeed a but-for cause of my death, but as my 
death is not a foreseeable result of his omission, he cannot be said to 
be a proximate cause of it. In other words, when dealing with the 
criminal negligence of individuals, courts already apply the same 
analysis from tort enterprise liability cases: they consider what harms 
are foreseeable given the activity engaged in. The requirement that 
the harm be substantially foreseeable, a requirement of the Model 
Penal Code and the states that follow it, recognizes the heightened 
degree of negligence necessary to rise to the level of criminal, rather 
than merely tortious, conduct. 
Thus, for a collective omission by a corporation to prevent a 
crime from occurring to meet the standard required to show 
proximate causation in criminal negligence, there must be a 
substantially foreseeable risk of a particular crime occurring. This 
begs the question: Foreseeable to whom? William Laufer’s 
proposal—that we ask what state of mind a reasonable corporation 
under similar circumstances would have had with respect to a 
particular crime—sought to introduce a welcome element of objective 
analysis into the inquiry.300 Yet, as mentioned previously, that 
proposal has been criticized for leaving unresolved the question of 
what a “reasonable corporation” is in the first place.301 While 
determining whether the risk of a particular crime is foreseeable may 
be less complex than Laufer’s proposal, which requires measuring the 
full gamut of states of mind against that of a reasonable corporation, 
it is clear that even the narrower question of objective foreseeability 
involves reference to a baseline reasonable corporation. 
Tort law again provides us with useful guidance here. When the 
question is simply whether a risk is foreseeable in determining 
whether an individual has been negligent, the prevailing analysis 
involves the dangers inherent in the underlying risky activity and the 
circumstances that surround it.302 The law does not ask whether a 
 
foreseeability of injury, from the act or omission is an indispensable element of 
negligence” (first citing Copeland v. State, 285 S.W. 565, 566 (Tenn. 1926); and then citing 
State v. Tankersley, 172 N.C. 955, 959–60, 90 S.E. 781, 783 (1916)). 
 300. Laufer, supra note 12, at 676–78, 701. 
 301. Diamantis, supra note 74, at 2074 (“To apply [Laufer’s] test for corporate mens 
rea, courts must already known what mental states an average corporation would have in 
various circumstances.”). 
 302. See Fowler Vincent Harper, The Foreseeability Factor in the Law of Torts, 7 
NOTRE DAME LAW. 468, 468–70 (1932) (“The whole idea of risk or threat is 
comprehended in the notion of foresight—foresight in the sense of the probability of harm 
resulting from conduct. Experience suggests the danger incident to certain activity. Not 
97 N.C. L. REV. 773 (2019) 
2019] TORT ANSWERS 833 
tortfeasor took the steps that he personally should have but rather 
whether his conduct met the standard of a reasonably prudent actor 
according to an “aggregate community measure.”303 While physical 
disability may be taken into account when measuring a tortfeasor’s 
conduct,304 the individualized mental characteristics of the defendant 
do not generally change the analysis unless the defendant is a child.305 
It is unclear why the corporate nature of the defendant should be 
any more relevant than the specific mental characteristics of an 
individual in determining whether a risk was objectively foreseeable. 
The question of whether there is a substantially foreseeable risk of an 
employee, acting within the scope of his or her employment, 
committing a crime is simple: Would a reasonable person, 
undertaking the same potentially risky enterprise as a corporation, 
have perceived the risk? Because the question of foreseeability is 
objective, it may not be necessary to look into the actual knowledge 
of individual constituents of a corporation to determine whose mental 
state should govern. The question of whether a risk is foreseeable 
attaches to the act itself and the degree of care desired from an 
individual undertaking it—whether the activity is running a factory or 
controlling the medical care of prepubescent girls. 
Indeed, the Restatement (Third) of Torts takes into consideration 
the specialized skills of a tortfeasors in its negligence analysis: “If an 
actor has skills or knowledge that exceed those possessed by most 
others, these skills or knowledge are circumstances to be taken into 
account in determining whether the actor has behaved as a 
reasonably careful person.”306 Doctors are the most obvious example 
of defendants held to a heightened standard of care; some 
jurisdictions have also applied it to architects, physical therapists, 
engineers, and construction workers.307 How to attribute a 
corporation’s employees’ collective knowledge and skills to the entity 
itself for the purposes of determining whether a risk is objectively 
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foreseeable would prove to be the trickiest part of this proposed 
standard. Yet to do business in nearly any sector a corporation must, 
as an entity, meet a myriad of licensing and certification standards. It 
does not require particularly elaborate mental gymnastics to ask what 
standard of care a reasonable person with the expertise required to 
meet those standards would adhere to in evaluating criminal risk 
associated with those areas of expertise. Doing so is entirely 
consistent with the philosophy of enterprise liability that has 
grounded respondeat superior in tort cases. 
D. Examples 
To understand how this new, tort-based rule would apply in 
practice, consider the following six hypothetical scenarios. 
1.  The Rogue Bid Rigger 
ABC Corporation is a government contractor doing business 
across the country. It has strong compliance programs in place to 
prevent its contracting officers from rigging bids for government 
contracts in violation of the Sherman Act.308 An individual officer is 
approached by his counterpart at DEF Corporation who proposes a 
scheme whereby ABC and DEF will coordinate bids for two 
upcoming construction contracts with the City of Toledo, allowing 
each of them to submit the lowest bid on one project. The ABC 
officer agrees. Here, the first and third prongs of the test are met: bid 
rigging is a crime, the substantial risk of which is foreseeable by 
anyone who undertakes a government contracting enterprise, and the 
crime occurred, the officer committed the actus reus of Sherman Act 
§	1, with the requisite mens rea insofar as he knowingly entered an 
anticompetitive conspiracy.309 The corporation would need to make a 
defense based upon its having taken all reasonable steps to prevent 
the crime. The evidentiary inquiry should not be simply whether a 
compliance program existed but how it operated in the specific 
circumstances. 
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2.  Collective Fault 
A bank has failed to report cash transfers greater than $10,000 in 
violation of the CTRA.310 The facts are identical to those of the Bank 
of New England case described above: multiple employees cashed 
checks to the same customer that added up to a sum greater than 
$10,000.311 Liability under the CTRA requires “proof of the 
defendant’s knowledge of the reporting requirement and his specific 
intent to commit the crime.”312 Assigning culpability to the employer 
would require a bit more than simply tallying the knowledge of the 
group, as the court did in that case. The question would be whether 
the multiple-transaction scenario was substantially foreseeable and 
whether the bank had taken reasonable steps to prevent it. Given the 
commonplace nature of the problem, the answers to these questions 
appear to be yes and no, respectively. This analysis again borrows 
from the structure of respondeat superior in the tort context. There 
may be cases where intentional torts cannot be vicariously imputed 
against an employer due to the frolic-and-detour principle. Yet direct 
liability for negligent hiring or entrustment may exist where the 
employer failed to exercise due care in giving responsibility to a 
particular employee and that employee committed a tort.313 Here, one 
could say that the employer’s negligence in allowing uncoordinated 
receipt of funds caused the foreseeable harm of these transactions. At 
that point, and only at that point, does it makes sense to impute all of 
the employees’ disparate knowledge to the employer. 
3.  The Sexually Abusive Doctor 
USA Gymnastics employed a doctor who repeatedly molested 
the little girls in his care. The evidence suggests that the organization 
routinely ignored complaints about his behavior and allowed him to 
continue in his role for years. The sexual abuse of vulnerable children 
by a doctor tasked with the care of particularly intimate sorts of 
medical problems is reasonably foreseeable by someone undertaking 
to run an athletic organization that will largely shape the health and 
lives of its participants throughout their childhoods and adolescence. 
(It would be far less foreseeable in a situation involving less physical 
intimacy and/or a lesser degree of control by the employee over the 
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child.) The crime occurred and USA Gymnastics appears to have 
taken few, if any, reasonable steps to prevent it or even to act upon 
the subjective awareness of irregularities by many of its employees. 
USA Gymnastics would be criminally liable. This hypothetical also 
provides a good opportunity to consider the role of subjective 
knowledge held by individual employees within this standard. The 
benefit of the foreseeability prong of my test is that it creates an 
objective standard that avoids philosophical conundrums about 
corporate subjectivity. Yet actual subjective knowledge held by 
individual employees becomes relevant, instead, at the second prong: 
it is very hard for a corporation to argue that its omission of 
reasonable steps did not cause the crime where its procedures were 
insufficient to receive and adequately respond to this information 
received by its employees. Subjective knowledge has evidentiary 
value on the question of whether an unreasonable omission occurred. 
4.  The Unforeseeable Offense 
A Seattle-based armored truck driver is loading a multimillion-
dollar transport load from a bank in downtown Seattle. During the 
tense process of getting the money into the truck, a particularly 
aggressive Canada goose descends from the heavens and begins 
attacking him. While the driver is in no actual danger, he cannot pick 
up the safes he is moving without the goose biting his hands. He 
draws his work-issued pistol and shoots the bird dead, in violation of 
the Migratory Bird Treaty (“MBT”).314 While this action was clearly 
within the scope of employment, the employer would be able to argue 
that the death of a protected bird was not a substantially foreseeable 
crime from the perspective of a reasonable operator of an armored 
truck company.  
5.  Corporate Homicide 
Take the facts of another earlier-mentioned case, Warner-
Lambert, where six of the defendant-gum-manufacturer’s employees 
died after magnesium stearate accumulated on the plant’s machines 
and in the air, causing an explosion.315 In that case the court held that, 
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the death of a protected bird, so the elements are met vis-à-vis the employee’s intentional 
shooting of the goose. See United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 488–89 
(5th Cir. 2015) (explaining that, for the purposes of the MBT, “a ‘taking’ is limited to 
deliberate acts done directly and intentionally to migratory birds”). 
 315. People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 414 N.E.2d 660, 662 (N.Y. 1980); see also supra 
note 195 and accompanying text. 
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because the corporate defendant was aware only of a “broad, 
undifferentiated risk of an explosion,” it could not be held liable as 
the particular pathway through which the explosion occurred was 
unforeseeable.316 Without getting too deep into the chemistry of 
magnesium stearate, assume for simplicity’s sake that an explosion 
occurred because one employee nonnegligently left dust of the 
compound on a machine and the other did something to render it 
airborne. The second employee’s action would not have been 
negligent had the compound, of which he was reasonably unaware, 
not been there. Like the knowledge of the bank employees in 
hypothetical #2, we can aggregate the conduct of the two employees 
into one criminally negligent transaction resulting in death 
(involuntary manslaughter), meeting the first prong of my test. The 
next question is whether the crime objectively substantially 
foreseeable. We know from the facts that the corporation was aware 
of the risk of explosion, so the question of whether a reasonable 
person engaging in the gum-manufacturing business would be aware 
of the substantial risk of involuntary manslaughter can probably be 
answered in the affirmative.317 The final question is whether anyone in 
the corporation took reasonable steps to prevent this sort of 
explosion. The corporation could use its evidence on how the 
particular pathway to explosion was unforeseeable to argue that there 
were no reasonable steps it could have taken to prevent it. But the 
government would then be free to argue that, particularly given the 
generalized risk of explosion, the manufacturer should have taken 
more steps to determine unknown unknowns and that this particular 
pathway was reasonably discoverable. 
6.  The Deliveryman Rapist 
The final example comes from one of the tort cases referenced 
above, in which the court found the employer liable when its truck 
driver raped a woman to whom he made a delivery. In this case we 
would, again, ask whether a substantial risk of the crime was 
objectively foreseeable. Without more facts, arguably not. Unlike a 
team doctor with repeated, unsupervised access to little girls, a 
deliveryman has limited access to and intimacy with his employer’s 
clients. Similarly, the government would have difficulty proving lack 
of reasonable steps (barring readily discoverable information that the 
 
 316. Id. at 661, 665–66. 
 317. Note that this analysis turns on whether a particular crime is foreseeable without 
reference to the particular logical pathway. 
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particular truck driver is a violent sex offender). Unlike USA 
Gymnastics, which had the same group of gymnasts in its care for 
many years and could reasonably have had far better reporting 
mechanisms in place, it would basically require an armed escort to 
police every deliveryman’s one-off interaction with every mail 
recipient to prevent this particular harm. This would likely be a case 
where the removal of the intent-to-benefit requirement would not 
render the employer liable for the sexual assault. 
E. Counterarguments 
There are two obvious potential objections to my proposal, one 
arguing that it will overly reduce corporate criminal liability and the 
other that it will burdensomely expand it. Both raise the basic 
problem inherent in any standard that turns on reasonableness and 
foreseeability. Such standards rely on jury decisionmaking (or at least 
the threat of jury decisionmaking) around the question of what 
constitutes reasonableness. And all such standards run the risk of so-
called hindsight bias, where a risk seems more foreseeable after it has 
occurred in fact.318 On one level, the critiques are valid; there is no 
more escaping those problems in the context of corporate criminal 
mens rea than in any other area of the law in which negligence 
standards carry weight. Considering both of these concerns together, 
however, gives reason to hope that the balance created by this 
standard will nonetheless be a substantial improvement over the 
status quo. 
The argument that removing pure strict liability from criminal 
respondeat superior would underpunish corporations says that to do 
so would allow corporations to waste enforcement resources by 
increasingly taking cases to trial and presenting complicated evidence 
about best practices in order to confuse juries. The argument that 
removing the intent-to-benefit requirement in favor of a causation 
analysis premised on foreseeability would overpunish says that 
corporations would be on the hook for all of the intentional torts 
committed in fact by their employees, based on an irrational view of 
foreseeability driven by hindsight bias. 
The underpunishment critique is valid to a point. Deep-pocketed 
corporations could and would hire experts to defend their practices 
 
 318. See Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinations of Negligence and the 
Hindsight Bias, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501, 502 (1996); Gregory N. Mandel, Patently 
Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions 
Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1394 (2006) (examining how hindsight bias impacts the 
nonobviousness determination in patent cases). 
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and procedures and to attest to the unforeseeability of particular 
events. In cases where shades of grey exist, it would be harder for the 
government to get a conviction than under the status quo where they 
have no obligation to show institutional fault and can, thus, more 
easily attain a plea or a deferred prosecution agreement. The 
response is that it is not clear that this is a bad thing. In the first place, 
evidence suggests that juries generally make the same determinations 
of negligence as judges considering the same facts.319 Even if there 
were fewer prosecutions than in a world without trials—a world 
which is hardly desirable320—there is no reason to believe that there 
would be a rash of actually culpable corporations getting a pass. The 
opposing position might counter that any theory should not worry 
about limiting corporate liability to the genuinely culpable; instead 
the theory should prioritize the deterrent power of allowing 
prosecutors to reach the corporate employer in all cases. Yet, by 
removing the intent-to-benefit requirement, my proposal gives 
prosecutors, in exchange for a tougher row to hoe in ambiguous cases, 
more enforcement bang for their buck in cases likely to be of higher 
profile and greatest expressive (and, thus, potentially deterrent) 
value. In their public statements, relatives of victims who perish due 
to corporate negligence routinely mention the lack of criminal 
punishment for the corporation as particularly outrageous.321 Under 
 
 319. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 63–64 (1966) 
(“[O]ver-all agreement on liability of 78 per cent [sic].”); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia 
Jury and Negligence: The View from the Trenches, 28 GA. L. REV. 1, 42–43 (1993) 
(discussing findings of the trial bar’s perceptions of the jury’s objectivity, obedience to law, 
and capacity for comprehension). 
 320. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2464, 2467–68 (2004) (arguing that uncertainty, money, self-interest, and 
demographic variation greatly influence plea bargains, such that they do not capture the 
outcomes that might expected at trial). See generally LAURA I. APPLEMAN, DEFENDING 
THE JURY: CRIME, COMMUNITY, AND THE CONSTITUTION (2015) (detailing the various 
challenges created by the justice system’s failure to integrate the community’s voice in the 
form of jury trials). 
 321. See, e.g., Legal Liability Issues Surrounding the Gulf Coast Oil Disaster: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 25 (2010) (statement of Keith D. 
Jones) (“Transocean, Halliburton, and any other company will be back because they have 
the infrastructure and economic might to make more money. But Gordon will never be 
back. Never. And neither will the 10 good men who died with him.”); THE BUFFALO 
CREEK FLOOD: AN ACT OF MAN TRANSCRIPT 5, http://www.buffalocreekflood.org/
media/BCF-transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/4M3Z-DN8F] (“We think that this coal 
company, Pittston, has murdered the people, and we call upon the prosecuting attorney 
and the judge .	.	. to prosecute and bring to trial this coal company .	.	.	.” (statement of 
statement of the Citizens’ Commission)); id. (“[T]he fact of the matter is that these are all 
laws on the books which the company felt completely free to ignore, which says something 
about the relationships between coal companies and state governments .	.	. just this 
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my proposal, prosecutors would get a wider range of tools to pursue 
corporations for crimes of particularly high public interest, such as 
involuntary manslaughter, which is a beneficial trade off. 
The overpunishment position is more easily dealt with. If there 
indeed exists a hindsight bias around the question of foreseeability, it 
would still result in fewer convictions of faultless corporations than in 
the current world, where the foreseeability of harm need not be 
proven at all! While the removal of the intent-to-benefit requirement 
could pose a danger of hindsight bias, leading to irrational liability in 
the fairly narrow category of cases involving intentional crimes, like 
sexual assault, it would greatly improve the chances of actually 
innocent corporations in the far, far broader swath of prosecutions 
involving the myriad strict liability offenses in the Federal Code. 
Negligence-based tests are imperfect but far better for innocent 
corporations than respondeat superior, where the after-the-fact 
distortions come not from the cognitive biases of jurors but the varied 
motivations of prosecutors. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have demonstrated how common law tort 
doctrines can be used to refine what remains a purely common law 
rule of criminal respondeat superior. Background tort developments 
around foreseeability and negligence as the touchstones for enterprise 
liability and the replacement of the intent-to-benefit requirement 
with a causation analysis shed light on the problems of over- and 
underinclusiveness on the criminal side. Therefore, the common law 
already contains the tools courts need to refine the poorly developed 
New York Central standard and resolve many of its sins in the modern 
enforcement era. There are obvious procedural challenges to a 
comprehensive judicial solution, most significantly that an elaborate 
redefinition of a criminal standard—particularly when it expands 
liability, as it would in some cases—creates a kind of ex post facto 
situation, or at least a stare decisis issue. Common law change would 
need to be extremely gradual to avoid these problems. 
That said, this Article opened with the observation that mens rea 
for regulatory and white-collar offenses has become an important 
enough political flashpoint as to have exploded a hard-won bipartisan 
coalition for criminal justice reform. While it is unlikely that my 
proposal on the specific issue of corporate criminal mens rea will fully 
 
complete freedom to ignore these laws with no fear of any kind of prosecution.” 
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please either side in that debate, it does contain a bit of something for 
everyone, which would make it a viable legislative fix in the absence 
of judicial intervention. Proponents of mens rea reform will argue 
that, even if we eliminate pure respondeat superior, individual 
defendants will nonetheless remain subject to the wide range of 
federal strict liability offenses. Critics of mens rea reform will argue 
that, due to the challenges inherent in prosecuting complex criminal 
offenses, requiring prosecutors to show any kind of corporate fault 
will reduce the number of successful white-collar prosecutions. 
Both objections are correct. Yet under this rule, reform 
proponents would certainly see some reduction in no-fault 
prosecutions and less uncertainty for commercial actors. And 
opponents would still see negligent corporations punished and an 
increase in corporate liability for the most egregious crimes of 
violence. Furthermore, unlike many sudden, broad-sweeping 
statutory revisions322—and like most state criminal codes—this 
proposal benefits from common law development. If the Supreme 
Court remains silent for another century on the question of white-
















 322. This includes the original proposal for mens rea reform, which suffered from 
many logical uncertainties when read in the context of the rest of the federal criminal 
code. See Orin Kerr, A Confusing Proposal to Reform the ‘Mens Rea’ of Federal Criminal 
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